Web of Ties:  The Effect of Relationship Ties on Government Funding for Nonprofit Organizations by Rico, Anthony Heath
University of Kentucky 
UKnowledge 
Theses and Dissertations--Public Policy and 
Administration 
Martin School of Public Policy and 
Administration 
2016 
Web of Ties: The Effect of Relationship Ties on Government 
Funding for Nonprofit Organizations 
Anthony Heath Rico 
University of Kentucky, ahrico5@gmail.com 
Digital Object Identifier: http://dx.doi.org/10.13023/ETD.2016.378 
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Rico, Anthony Heath, "Web of Ties: The Effect of Relationship Ties on Government Funding for Nonprofit 
Organizations" (2016). Theses and Dissertations--Public Policy and Administration. 18. 
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/msppa_etds/18 
This Doctoral Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Martin School of Public Policy and 
Administration at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations--Public Policy and 
Administration by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact 
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 
STUDENT AGREEMENT: 
I represent that my thesis or dissertation and abstract are my original work. Proper attribution 
has been given to all outside sources. I understand that I am solely responsible for obtaining 
any needed copyright permissions. I have obtained needed written permission statement(s) 
from the owner(s) of each third-party copyrighted matter to be included in my work, allowing 
electronic distribution (if such use is not permitted by the fair use doctrine) which will be 
submitted to UKnowledge as Additional File. 
I hereby grant to The University of Kentucky and its agents the irrevocable, non-exclusive, and 
royalty-free license to archive and make accessible my work in whole or in part in all forms of 
media, now or hereafter known. I agree that the document mentioned above may be made 
available immediately for worldwide access unless an embargo applies. 
I retain all other ownership rights to the copyright of my work. I also retain the right to use in 
future works (such as articles or books) all or part of my work. I understand that I am free to 
register the copyright to my work. 
REVIEW, APPROVAL AND ACCEPTANCE 
The document mentioned above has been reviewed and accepted by the student’s advisor, on 
behalf of the advisory committee, and by the Director of Graduate Studies (DGS), on behalf of 
the program; we verify that this is the final, approved version of the student’s thesis including all 
changes required by the advisory committee. The undersigned agree to abide by the statements 
above. 
Anthony Heath Rico, Student 
Dr. Dwight V. Denison, Major Professor 
Dr. Eugenia F. Toma, Director of Graduate Studies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WEB OF TIES:  THE EFFECT OF RELATIONSHIP TIES 
ON GOVERNMENT FUNDING FOR NONPROFIT 
ORGANIZATIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSERTATION 
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School at 
the University of Kentucky 
 
 
 
By 
Anthony Heath Rico 
 
Lexington, Kentucky 
 
Director:  Dr. Dwight V. Denison, Professor of Public and 
Nonprofit Finance, Martin School of Public Policy and 
Administration 
 
Lexington, Kentucky 
 
2016 
 
Copyright © Anthony Heath Rico 2016 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
WEB OF TIES:  THE EFFECT OF RELATIONSHIP TIES ON GOVERNMENT FUNDING 
FOR NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 
 
 Chapter 1 raises the research question guiding this study.  Do relationships that 
board members of nonprofits have to officials in other agencies affect the likelihood of 
acquiring grants?  The objective of this study was to examine the role that relationship 
ties played in the nonprofit sector’s ability to receive grants. 
 
 Chapter 2 ties the research agenda to existing research.  Nonprofit organizational 
and financial behavior was explained in terms of resource dependence.  Since nonprofit 
organizations face uncertainty in resource allocation, the behavior of the organization and 
the board members change in reaction to uncertainty.  The relationships that board 
members possess serve as social capital for the nonprofit through a series of formal and 
informal ties.   
 
 Chapter 3 provides a theoretical framework for measuring relationship ties as well 
as other variables to funding.  Ties that were measured included previous work 
experience in government agencies, nonprofit agencies, for-profit organizations, and 
universities.  Relationships ties also included previous appointment to a nonprofit board 
and membership in professional associations.  Additional variables such as financial and 
organizational measures were considered that had an effect on funding likelihood.  
Expected funding then became a function of all of these variables.  This framework led to 
the hypothesis that nonprofits with a greater number of relationship ties, controlling for 
appropriate variables, will receive more funds from a government agency. 
 
 Chapter 4 describes the methods used.  The sample of organizations included 176 
nonprofit community healthcare organizations over the span of five fiscal years.  Board 
member names, financial and organizational data, and relationship ties were collected as 
they were expected to affect funding outcomes.  Information on relationships was 
obtained from three sources:  LinkedIn profiles, Who’s Who profiles, and agency 
websites.  Financial and organizational variables were obtained from nonprofit 
organizations’ 990 tax forms. 
 
  
 Chapter 5 details the analyses and the results from the collected data.  Conducted 
analyses included a series of multiple regressions, a probit regression, and fixed-effects 
and between-effects panel data regression models.  The findings partially supported the 
hypothesis.  While there were some relationship ties that were correlated to anticipated 
funding, the effects were small across analyses.  Financial and organizational variables 
overshadowed the effects of relationship ties.  There was evidence of mediation in that a 
number of variables were significant only if board members were in an organization 
receiving funds prior to the examined time period.  Ties to other nonprofits mattered only 
when an agency already had funding. 
 
 Chapter 6 concludes with possible explanations, policy implications, and further 
directions. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
 Grant writers seek the perfect formula that creates a successful proposal to secure 
funds.  Though many nonprofits rely on fundraising, there are situations in which 
agencies cannot cover all operational costs with contributions.  Nonprofit organizations 
often need to fund operations through external sources such as grants.  When funding is 
limited, grants from government and other nonprofit agencies become an essential part of 
remaining operational.  Such funding situations lead to the question of how to secure 
essential grants, how to write them effectively and efficiently, and what components a 
grant writer should include in a proposal to capture the attention of grantors.  This work 
asked specifically whether highlighting board members’ relationships to other 
organizations was useful in obtaining grants. 
Regardless of the talents of a grant writer or the capacity of the organization, there 
are variables outside of the grant proposal that can affect the likelihood of an 
organization’s acquisition of funds.  Such variables can influence a grantor’s decision; for 
example, political variables, such as Congressional district funding priorities, or personal 
variables including established relationships with a powerful decision maker in a 
government agency.  This study focused on personal variables including existing 
relationships and their influence in grant acquisition.  Among the questions this research 
raised were:  Did an agency that had personal relationship connections to a grantor 
increase its chance of securing a grant?  Did relationships to officials in other agencies 
have an effect on grant acquisition outcomes?  It is likely that an organization’s 
reputation or track record with a grantor comes into play in grant acquisition.   
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In addition to previous performance with a grant, the objective of this study was to 
examine the role that relationship ties played in the nonprofit sector’s ability to receive 
grants, examining this relationship from a resource dependence theory perspective. 
This study proposed that board members of nonprofits with a greater number of 
relationship ties were expected to receive more funds from a government agency.  The 
population for this study was 176 nonprofit community healthcare centers in the Midwest 
region.  The total amount of Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) 
grants per organization was used as the measure of funding.  Total HRSA funds, grant 
revenue and expenditures, assets, organizational variables, and board membership and 
upper management appointments were collected from IRS 990 data (Internal Revenue 
Service, 2015).  Affiliation to government officials, other nonprofits, for-profit agencies, 
universities, and other nonprofit board appointments were collected from biographies on 
nonprofit websites, the Marquis Who’s Who database (Marquis Who’s Who Ventures, 
2016), and LinkedIn information (LinkedIn, 2016).  Previous work experience in 
government, other nonprofit agencies, for-profit agencies, previous appointments to 
another nonprofit healthcare agency’s board, and biographical listings of memberships in 
professional associations such as the American Medical Association and the American 
College of Healthcare Executives was also reviewed.   
Independent variables were examined from fiscal years 2008 to 2012 as they 
affected HRSA funding for fiscal years 2009 to 2013.  The number of ties and the 
closeness of ties controlling for other funding determinants served as the key independent 
variables while the magnitude of HRSA funds served as the dependent variable.  This 
study tested whether the number of ties a board member or manager had with other 
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nonprofits and government officials explained variation in the amount of federal funding, 
over and above other predictors of the amount of funding received.  A probit regression 
was used to determine the likelihood of funding based upon the mixture of independent 
variables.  Multiple regressions without panel data were utilized in order to build future 
panel data models as well as preview any existing significant relationships.  Finally, 
panel data regressions were conducted to determine if explanatory variables affected 
funding over a period of time.   
 The purpose of this quantitative study was to apply resource dependence theory to 
examine how relationships between officials can significantly impact such operational 
issues as funding revenue. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The objective of this study was to understand the role that relationship ties play in 
the nonprofit sector’s ability to receive grants.  Government agencies provide funding to 
nonprofits while nonprofits provide services to government in specifically-targeted ways.  
Nonprofits generally have scarce resources, therefore organizations must rely upon 
donations and grants in order to pay for operational costs.  The idea of reliance upon 
external forces aligns with resource dependency theory in organizational behavior.  In 
Chapter 2, the concepts and theories from the resource dependency literature are applied 
to nonprofits and revenue from government grants. 
Resource Dependence 
The premise behind resource dependence is that the behavior and structure of an 
organization are shaped by the constraints and availability of external resources (Hillman, 
Withers, & Collins, 2009; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Thompson, 1967).  When the 
relationship is symbiotic, as is often the case with nonprofit operations that are 
government funded, the output of one organization becomes the input of another 
organization (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  The output of the government, in this case, 
funding, is the input for the nonprofit in terms of income.  The output of the nonprofit, 
provided services, is the input for the government.  For example, a local health 
department needs to provide cancer screening services for the citizens of a county and 
authorizes a grant from its budget (output from the government) for the provision of such 
service from a vendor. The nonprofit receives the grant (input for the nonprofit) from the 
government while providing cancer screening for the community (output from the 
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nonprofit).  The cancer screening activities become a product in which the government 
has purchased (input for the government)  
However, the government/nonprofit cycle is not as simple as described.  It is true 
that nonprofits and governments depend upon each other as the demand for services 
outweighs the number of nonprofit and government suppliers.  Milward and Provan 
(2000) described a “hollow state” in which central government becomes an empty core in 
respect to service provision.  Services that are mandated by the government are 
contracted out to local nonprofits.  By contracting out the services that the government 
creates and legislates, several layers of separation are created making monitoring of 
services a difficult endeavor.  The layers of administration subject the simple output/input 
cycle to multiple influences such as contract adherence and the influence of a market for 
service provision.  The influence of a market for service provision drives the cost of the 
service ultimately affecting the amount of the grant (Milward & Provan, 2000).  As is 
often the case, contracts for services go to the agency providing the lowest cost thus 
influencing who becomes the chosen service provider.  Contract enforcement and 
adherence often affects not only the choice of service provider but also the quality of the 
service.  The vision of the outcome of service provision may be different for the nonprofit 
than for the government thus necessitating coordination, negotiation, and monitoring. 
As a nonprofit becomes a reputable agency that adheres to contracting 
requirements, the agency’s influence on the provider market becomes greater.  The effect 
of the agency’s reputation and legitimacy is a reduction of competitors that government 
officials are willing to consider.  As Milward and Provan (2000) note, new agencies 
entering the market of service provision require new administrative infrastructure.  
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Performance of the provider and the government decreases when the input/output cycle 
gains a new competitor.  While the decline in performance is temporary, the costs of new 
providers do not go unnoticed.  Therefore, the input/output cycle between government 
and nonprofits is most effective when the system is stable (Milward & Provan, 2000). 
In addition to markets and contract regulations, when constraints are conflicting, 
the organization must maximize its resources by choosing the group that provides the 
greatest benefit (Oliver, 1990; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  Nonprofit organizations may 
face a multitude of constraints such as decreased funding or increased service 
populations.  The nonprofit agency must either limit services or seek more inputs.  Faced 
with such constraints, the nonprofit may choose to acquire funding from a government in 
order to provide more services.  Grant funding requires nonprofit organizations to adhere 
to the rules and regulations of the government.  In the case of a nonprofit organization 
relying upon government funding for operational costs, the government’s intentions can 
shape the goals of the organization and the selection of its board members (Grant & 
Baden-Fuller, 2004).  Through stipulations it places on the funds, governments may 
require nonprofits to promote its services to populations that the nonprofit had never 
considered.  This might change the goals of the nonprofit as a direct result of government 
funding. 
Organizations may be viewed as entities under the confines of bounded 
rationality.  In addition to government intent, organizations consider a number of 
variables to maximize utility within the context of limiting factors (Oliver, 1990; Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1978).  According to March (1962), it is in an organization’s best interest to 
maximize its utility with respect to resources.  In terms of efficiency, utility can be a 
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subjective issue.  What maximizes utility for one firm will not hold true for another firm.  
In the case of public versus private firms, a for-profit firm may choose to increase profits 
as a utility-maximizing behavior whereas a non-profit organization may decide that 
serving the most clients with limited resources is its utility-maximizing option (Dranove, 
1988; Pauley, 1987).  For example, a for-profit hospital maximizes utility by maximizing 
profit.  To maximize profit, a for-profit hospital might choose to increase available 
services to patients who utilize procedures with the greatest profit margin.  In essence, the 
for-profit hospital promotes high cost services to patients that are relatively low cost for 
the hospital to administer.  A nonprofit hospital maximizes utility by serving the most 
clients possible given the nonprofit’s limited resources.  In this case, a nonprofit may 
offer the least costly service to patients diminishing the regard to profit margin.  Despite 
these different approaches, what maximizes utility for many firms is the allocation of 
resources.   
Resource allocation is directly related to resource dependence theory.  One of the 
major tenets of a resource dependence perspective is that organizations are not 
autonomous.  Organizations are constrained by dependencies upon other organizations 
that possess vital resources for operations (Pfeffer, 1987; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  In 
the case of nonprofits, external funding becomes a constraint and, therefore, shapes the 
behavior of the organization.  Funding sources might come with regulations in which to 
adhere.  A grant might require that services are provided only to individuals below a 
certain income threshold or that an organization must create a position for a specialist.  
With additional constraints, the organization might change the way it conducts business.  
The organization shifts existing resources in order to fulfill the regulations of the grant.  
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The survival of the organization depends upon procuring resources from the environment.  
As a result, the organization is faced with the uncertainty of its ability to secure 
resources. 
Uncertainty 
Uncertainty is a force that restructures organizations in a manner that will sustain 
the agencies (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005).  When an organization is faced with 
uncertainty, it must evaluate its environment in order to achieve its goals.  For instance, 
in the case of a nonprofit, the agency may find itself with a large deficit in its budget 
before the fiscal year has ended.  The nonprofit then seeks out ways that it can survive the 
remainder of its budget cycle.  It can decrease its expenditures in a number of ways such 
as reducing supplies, services, or personnel.  It can increase revenue by seeking 
endowments, contributions, or grants.  Regardless of its path, the goals and strategies of 
the organization are not as they were before they entered the period of economic 
uncertainty.  A lack of necessary resources shifts the organization’s goals in order to deal 
with constraints.  The organization’s uncertainty in its financial viability forces it to 
consider its options for the future.  The result is a change in the organization’s strategy of 
operation. 
An organization changes its strategies in a variety of ways.  Organizations 
develop strategies that are relationship-based in order to survive uncertainty (Pearce, 
Dibble, & Klein, 2009).  When an organization, such as a nonprofit, must rely upon a 
government entity, the relationship strategies employed by the nonprofit depend upon the 
government agency.  Relationship-based strategies used to manage financial uncertainty 
may include cultivating ties to government agencies.  For example, a nonprofit may 
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cultivate a tie to a government agency by increasing the amount of communication to a 
grant officer or to an official with significant power over granting decisions.   
The relationship-based strategies become a necessity for the nonprofit in that it is 
no longer an independent entity from the government.  Accepting federal funds to cover 
certain operations puts the nonprofit under the operational authority of the government, at 
least partially.  After accepting a grant, the nonprofit organization has to fulfill the grant’s 
requirements, thus changing the focus of the organization from its original intent. 
Uncertainty affects the goals of the organization.  However, uncertainty also 
affects the outcomes produced by an organization.  Outcomes are a product of the 
network in which the organizations are embedded (Parsons, 1956).  Embeddedness refers 
to the amount of social constraints between a group of entities that affect their ability to 
remain independent (Granovetter, 1985).  While the concept of embeddedness might 
seem organizationally restricting, the results are advantageous.  Embeddedness within a 
network reduces risk and allows for the exchange of services without explicit contracts.  
Exchange between two embedded entities occurs outside of the explicitly stated contract 
with the understanding that neither entity will take advantage of the situation (Batenburg, 
Raub, & Snijders, 2003). 
Further, embeddedness within a network allows for additional opportunities for 
resource exchange between the two entities.  For instance, if an organization provides a 
service to other entities in a network, the provider becomes embedded within that 
network.  The other entities then trust that provider.  The trust between the two entities 
becomes the basis of a risk assessment of the provider.  In the future, when services are 
needed, the entities within the network may call upon the provider.  The embedded 
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provider now has a demonstrated history of service with minimal risk.  Since there is 
more trust between the entities, an embedded organization can reduce contracting costs 
(Uzzi, 1997).  A reputation of trustworthiness reduces the necessity of bidding out a 
contract to organizations outside of a network.  
Organizations such as nonprofits are led by a team of board members who come 
to the agency with existing ties.  In many cases, the ties that a board member possesses 
leads to embeddedness within a network of other like-minded board members from other 
agencies.  Embeddedness originates from board interlock in which a board member of 
one organization joins the board of another organization (Burt, 1980; Mizruchi, 1996).  
When board interlock occurs, information flowing from one organization to another is 
viewed as more credible and trustworthy (Haunschild, 1993).  The board interlock 
spawns ties among board members from a variety of other organizations.  The 
organizations reap the benefits of interlock by having access to a network of connected 
board members.  It is the board member who is embedded within an interlocked network.  
Thus, when the board member relies upon his/her embeddedness, the organization 
represented by the board member also becomes embedded in the network of interlocked 
organizations. 
Once board members become embedded in a series of ties, the ties then influence 
the outcome.  In the context of the nonprofit organization, the organization appoints 
board members that are connected in an embedded network.  The ties consist of 
relationships with government agencies.  The relationship ties of board members and 
government officials influence the outcome which, in this case, is government funding. 
The manner in which these ties work results in an interdependence between the nonprofit 
11 
 
and the government agency (Parsons, 1956).  The output of one organization in 
interdependent relations becomes the input of the other, and vice versa (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978).  The output of the government, in this case, funding, becomes the input 
of the nonprofit, operational revenue.  Likewise, the output of the nonprofit, 
programmatic outcomes, becomes the input of the government, service provision.  The 
interdependence between government and the nonprofit is important because the 
relationship between the two entities allows the nonprofit to achieve its desired outcomes.  
Even when government funding is a small percentage of a nonprofit’s total revenue, if 
funding is used for operations crucial to the nonprofit’s mission, the portion covered by 
government funding becomes a priority for the organization (Parsons, 1956).  
Priorities and Organizational Change 
How resources are allocated during times of uncertainty becomes a matter of 
prioritization.  Prioritizing the allocation of resources is not a ‘black box’ phenomenon; 
interest groups that have control over an organization influence the allocation of 
resources (March, 1962).  Each group has the potential to become a coalition – an interest 
group.  It is the power of the interest group that controls parts of the organization and 
shifts resources towards the group’s ultimate purposes (March, 1962).  Because the 
nature and composition of the interest groups in an organization shift, the goals of the 
organization shift in response to changes in the interest group (Goodstein & Boeker, 
1991).  Government agencies that provide large sources of funding are a key interest 
group for many nonprofits.  Government influence shapes the nonprofit’s goals.  
Government becomes the primary coalition because covering large portions of the 
nonprofit’s operating costs achieves agenda dominance.  When the nonprofit knows that 
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its primary interest group is the government, the nonprofit shifts its goals to align with 
government grantors. 
Nonprofits shift goals towards their funding needs.  Funding needs shape an 
organization in a variety of ways, including size and personnel usage (Baron, Dobbin, & 
Jennings, 1986).  The need for certain operations becomes a tangible way in which 
organizations form.  Using the example of a nonprofit healthcare center, a need for nurses 
causes the healthcare center to focus its recruiting efforts on hiring and retaining nursing 
staff.  Providing salaries for additional nursing staff creates an increase in the need for 
funding of the new personnel.  The goals of the nonprofit changes from a state of status 
quo to one of financial scarcity.  The goal is now to cover the additional costs of new 
staff.  Baron, Mittman, and Newman (1991) found that organizational change occurs 
faster when the organization relies upon federal and state funding due to increased 
scrutiny from external agents as they manage scarce resources.   
Shifting goals also changes the shape of the organization (Goodstein & Boeker, 
1991).  For a nonprofit, the amount of funding can shape the size of the board of directors 
as well as the upper management.  More funding is likely to lead to more programming 
which ultimately increases the size of the organization (Haveman, 1993).  Thus, larger 
organizations tend to have larger boards of directors (Pfeffer, 1972).  As with the 
previous example with nurses, if the nonprofit organization acquires a large grant from a 
federal agency, the nonprofit finds itself under the watch of a federal auditing 
department.  In order to fulfill the requirements of the grant as well as avoid an audit, the 
nonprofit is wise to increase its staff.  Not only will the nonprofit agency hire more 
nursing staff as a result of the incoming grant, it may hire staff that serve as liaisons 
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between the nonprofit and the federal government.  It may also find a need to appoint 
additional board members that specialize in communication with government entities.  
The change in organizational priorities occurs quickly, mostly likely in the course of a 
fiscal year.  The change is also dramatic in that the nonprofit faces additional tasks 
because of new funding pools. 
Not only does organizational change come from external sources, but change can 
come from within.  Individuals with particularly influential interests possess power as a 
result of the position that they hold in the organization (Pfeffer, 1987).  In the world of 
nonprofits, some of the most powerful positions are those of the board members.  
Positions with power control organizations in a number of ways.  For instance, positions 
of power can shape budgets and organizational missions.  In many circumstances, it is not 
the person that fills the position but the position itself that holds the power.  Pfeffer 
(1987) described how the Dean of the Harvard Business School is sought after to sit on a 
board not because he/she is John/Joan Smith but because he/she is the Dean of the 
Harvard Business School, a powerful position at a prestigious agency.  Agencies request 
the Dean to serve on their board because of their power in an interorganizational network 
and assumes access to other powerful agencies.  To translate Pfeffer’s (1987) finding to 
the context of nonprofits and government, a nonprofit will seek to appoint Bob Finance to 
serve on its board not because that person is Bob Finance but because that person is the 
Secretary of the United States Treasury.  By appointing the Secretary of the Treasury to 
the board, the nonprofit gains a powerful connection to potential fiscal resources to fund 
future operational costs.  In the appointment of a government official, the nonprofit then 
accesses that person’s human and social capital. 
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Social capital 
 
There are three types of capital that organizations rely upon to achieve goals:  
financial, human, and social capital (Coleman, 1988).  Financial capital involves 
economic resources such as revenue and credit.  Human capital is comprised of the skill 
and knowledge of an organization’s workforce.  Finally, there is social capital which is 
the worth of an organization’s network ties and relationships with other entities.  For 
example, financial gain from information sharing with a close business associate is an 
example of social capital.  Organizations constantly manipulate these three types of 
capital in order to obtain maximum efficiency of resource allocation.   
Social capital increases economic benefits in a number of ways.  Social capital is 
comprised of many aspects.  Adler and Kwon (2002) defined social capital as goodwill 
between two entities that facilitates action.  Further, goodwill is sympathy and trust from 
friends (Adler & Kwon, 2002).  Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) suggested the human and 
social capital of an individual included advice, access to information, preferential access 
to resources, and legitimacy.  Significant empirical evidence supported these proposed 
benefits.  For example, Provan (1980) found that firms that were able to attract powerful 
members of the community onto their boards were able to acquire critical resources from 
the environment.  By attracting community members with powerful connections, a 
nonprofit agency can access the knowledge and social connections that the member 
possesses.  Eng, Liu, and Sekhon (2012) demonstrated that nonprofit organizations 
utilized ties to acquire much needed financial and human resources to achieve their 
missions. 
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Ties become important in securing funds by building bridges to lucrative 
resources to maintain the survival of the organization.  The survival of the organization 
relies upon dependencies outside of the agency.  Establishing favorable ties is a way an 
organization manages its external dependencies (Kotter, 1979).  When nonprofit 
organizations appoint a board member with a variety of ties to banks and grantors, the 
organization assumes that it will become privy to the same network as the banks and 
grantors.  The organization uses ties to other likeminded organizations that have vital 
resources.  The importance of ties assumes that each relationship holds the same 
importance.  However, not all ties are created equally in that some ties hold greater 
weight than others. 
There are a number of ties that an organization may perceive as vital.  One way to 
measure vital ties in the world of nonprofit resources is through government service 
tenure (Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi, & Cannella, 2008).  Tenure refers to the length of 
time of government service.  The longer a person serves in an agency, the more likely 
that person will have connections to other officials.  Connections may be superficial, 
consisting of limited electronic communications.  However, superficial connections may 
ultimately lead to future positive results. 
Discussion of the depth of a connection warrants an additional facet to its 
significance.  The breadth of the connection is also an important consideration.  A short 
term connection that carries a great amount of significance can be as impactful as a long 
term superficial connection.  For instance, a program manager who worked directly in 
conjunction with a U.S. Senator for two years may be as significant of a connection as 
one from the same program manager who communicated once a year to another program 
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manager over the course of twenty years.  In both cases, the program manager has access 
to an additional outlet of resources be it revenue, information, or future connections.  
Government tenure (length) as well as the quantity of different experiences (breadth) 
within the government provide access to current government decision makers.   
With access to government decision makers comes advantages.  Not only would a 
government official have access to prestige and legitimacy, but they would also bring 
expertise in the form of interactions with other political decision makers (Lester, Hillman, 
Zardkoohi, & Cannella, 2008).  The benefits from connections that come with a 
government official feed into the social capital.  Each year of government service 
increases the odds of obtaining a board appointment at another agency.  Therefore, each 
year of tenure at a government agency increases the odds of building a connection for the 
appointed agency.  For a nonprofit, board members with tenure in the government 
theoretically improve the number of connections, and thus the number of connections for 
the nonprofit.  The nonprofit agency must utilize the social capital of the board member 
to its advantage.   
Utilizing the social capital of its board members is a distinct advantage for an 
agency.  By drawing upon the connections of its board members, an agency is able to 
reduce its transaction costs (Dyer & Chu, 2003; Hillman et al., 2000).  Connections to 
agencies in which an organization is dependent are a way that an organization can survive 
(Kotter, 1979).  When an agency without social capital devotes time and personnel for the 
purpose of securing potential funding connections, resources must be taken away from 
operational functions.  In the case of a nonprofit, these operational functions are likely to 
be mission related.   
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Nonprofit agencies might find it necessary to justify actions that do not provide 
direct services to targeted populations.  While fundraising activities are vital for survival, 
fundraising activities cost the nonprofit agency in terms of time taken away from mission 
related activities.  However, one way that a nonprofit agency can save on such costs is to 
cultivate and utilize existing connections.  Government officials with access to 
information about potential funding are one such connection.  Appointing a government 
official, in essence, reduces transaction costs as well as increases access to current 
officials (Dyer & Chu, 2003; Hillman et. al., 2000).  When access to officials increases, 
there is a greater chance of building a relationship based upon trust. 
Informal Ties as Social Capital 
Trust-based relationships develop from informal ties.  A network of executives 
manage uncertainty by maintaining informal ties among themselves (Westphal et. al., 
2006).  Informal ties are those that do not arise from planned interaction (Kratzer, 
Leenders, & Van Engelen, 2005).  Informal ties may be those that develop from 
impromptu or non-intentional interactions.  In a sense, an informal tie may be ‘off the 
record’ or outside of the workplace (Oh, Chung, & Labianca, 2004).  Conversely, an 
example of a formal tie may be a relationship established by an organization or group, 
such as those found on an official organizational chart.  In many cases, information other 
individuals might not be privy to or that is not ‘on the record’ may be easily shared 
among informal ties.  Information shared through informal ties can include information 
about new employment or available funds.  Such information may not be readily 
available to all members of a formal network. 
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Informal ties grow among executives in an attempt to gain information about 
resource availability.  As such, in order to gain information about potential funding 
sources, nonprofit executives and board members nurture informal ties among other 
executives and board members. In this scenario, government agency officials with 
decision making power are invited to sit on a nonprofit’s board (Westphal et. al., 2006).  
When officials become friends as a result of informal ties, they begin to trust each other 
and share sensitive information (Oh, Chung, & Labianca, 2004).   
In addition to increasing the sharing of sensitive information, developing trust 
also reduces competitive uncertainty (Westphal et. al, 2006).  When individuals trust each 
other, they are less likely to compete for resources; in fact, they might share resources 
through joint ventures (Kotter, 1979).  They might also make agreements about the 
exclusive use of resources.  For instance, individuals who trust each other may agree that 
one entity has use of a resource for one time period while the other entity has use of the 
resource for the following period.  As with individuals, organizations may exhibit the 
same behaviors among other trusted agencies.  Nonprofits may be more likely to share 
resources and collaborate with trusted nonprofits including sharing valuable information 
about open funding sources. 
An informal tie benefits a nonprofit if the tie is with a government agency.  By 
fostering informal ties, nonprofits manifest reliance and choose board members that have 
ties to government.  One goal of an organization could be to increase government 
coalitions by appointing board members with a greater number of ties to government 
(Harlan and Saidel, 1994; Pfeffer, 1973).  By appointing board members with a greater 
number of ties to government, the nonprofit agency increases the likelihood of a direct 
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line of communication to vital funding sources (Harlan & Saidel, 1994; Pfeffer, 1973).  
In some cases, direct lines of communication may be informal lines of communication.  
The transaction of appointing board members from granting agencies is a way in which a 
nonprofit obtains resources for survival (Parsons, 1956).  To ensure survival is to reduce 
uncertainty. 
By reducing uncertainty, the nonprofit views the government as its primary 
customer and, in order to ensure survival, creates its goals influenced by its largest 
customer (March and Simon, 1958).  It is often that the largest customer becomes an 
influential interest group.  Organizations interact with interest groups in order to reduce 
uncertainty (Parsons, 1956).  To reduce uncertainty means to attend to key stakeholders 
in the organization’s goals.  For a nonprofit that relies heavily upon government funding, 
the nonprofit’s best interest is to prioritize in favor of the government agency that 
provides funds. 
Appointing government officials to a board is a way a nonprofit acts to ensure its 
survival.  An organization would attempt to manage its dependency if it is an entity under 
bounded rationality (Thompson, 1967).  The status of an organization is a product of how 
much interdependence exists between funder and service provider.  An organization’s 
interdependence hinges upon the proportion of its need for resources.  According to 
Thompson (1967), an organization that needs support can fulfill its needs by seeking 
prestige.  By seeking prestige, the organization obtains power.  One way in which an 
organization can obtain power and prestige is by appointing powerfully tied board 
members to its executive committee.  By appointing a well-connected board, the 
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nonprofit and the government agency reduce their uncertainties.  The nonprofit acquires 
direct access to a funder while the government gains a service provider.   
Resource dependence theory, then, suggests that nonprofits maintain external 
linkages to government to ensure access to needed capital (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) in 
an effort to reduce uncertainty.  Additionally, dependence on resources creates a need for 
nonprofits to create a network of personnel that encourages coalition and opportunity 
building not otherwise afforded to entities outside of the network (O’Toole, 2014).  
Participation in a network enhances reputation and legitimacy.  Legitimacy is one way an 
organization ensures stability (Oliver, 1991).  A trustworthy reputation results from 
building relationships between two organizations (Alexander & Nank, 2009).  Such a 
relationship is more likely to occur when decision makers are strongly tied to granting 
officials. 
How the Board Networks 
The composition of the board corresponds to the needs of the organization.  As 
Pfeffer (1973) discussed, the composition of the board correlates with various aspects of 
the organization.  For example, the larger the budget of a hospital, the more financial 
directors serve on the board.  The need for an understanding of financial matters leads to 
the appointment of more financial experts on the board in an effort to manage a larger 
budget.  Pfeffer (1974) found the same correlation between manufacturing firms and 
board composition.  The industry of the agency has a large effect on the appointment of 
the type of board member.  In a healthcare setting, appointments of board members who 
are health care professionals such as nurses or doctors are more likely.  Executives 
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familiar with the health care setting are equally more likely to be appointed to the board 
of a healthcare facility. 
Following the logic that the composition of the board corresponds to the needs of 
the organization, it is likely that the proportion of government officials serving on a board 
correlates to the amount of funding a nonprofit receives from the government.  Pfeffer 
and Salancik (1978) found that organizations that depended upon the government made 
more campaign contributions.  For instance, an organization that relied heavily upon 
government funding might be more likely to make donations to politicians that favored 
the organization’s mission.  An organization that caters to women’s health issues and 
relies upon a large amount of its funding from the National Institute of Health is more 
likely to make contributions to a politician whose platform includes increasing breast 
cancer awareness.  Approval of making political contributions comes from an agency’s 
board decisions.  It would seem more likely for a board influenced by government 
agencies to condone an organization’s political contributions.  Board members affiliated 
with government agencies approve political campaigning.  In any case, the influence of 
the government on the board member shapes the board’s behavior in a variety of 
manners. 
Thompson (1967) described how organizations that were tied together found 
themselves in situations of organizational inbreeding.  Inbreeding refers to a system of 
co-opting and coalescing with a group of other similar organizations (Thompson, 1967).  
An atmosphere of corporate inbreeding can lead to stagnation as well as scrutiny from 
outside entities.  As a result, organizations that are tied together must collaborate to 
establish impartial organizations that set standards for an industry.  Ties can come in the 
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form of professional associations.  In order to ensure that a group of organizations remain 
credible, the rational organization devotes time to cultivate ties through professional 
associations and other competing agencies.  For example, the nonprofit may appoint 
board members from other nonprofits in order to maintain access to accrediting entities.  
By having members of another nonprofit on a board, the agency builds a reputation that it 
collaborates with other agencies and becomes a legitimate player in the web of affiliated 
nonprofits. 
In addition to informal ties, organizations that rely upon government funding 
build relationships by developing formal collaboration (Guo & Acar, 2005).  Formal 
collaborations may become advantageous.  Formal collaborations and relationships can 
develop by filing joint applications for grants.  As a grant recipient, formal ties develop 
through grant management activity with the government as well as with other recipients.  
In many cases, recipients are required to attend grantee meetings with other similar 
organizations.  Such meetings are primarily for the dissemination of grant management 
information from the government.  These meetings, however, often lead to networking 
opportunities with other grantees.  In a manner of speaking, receiving a government grant 
leads to the development of formal relationship ties not only with government agents but 
also with potential collaborators.  Organizations with no government funding would not 
receive the same level of structured networking opportunities without the environment of 
a government grantee information meeting.   
The benefits of networking do not only arise from government activities.  In 
addition to formal collaborations with the government, networking opportunities can 
arise from other linkages to corporations.  Some evidence suggests that board linkages 
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create a network effect in that contributions to nonprofits increase when executives of 
for-profit organizations are on the boards of nonprofits (Galaskiewicz & Rauschenbach, 
1988).  Galaskiewicz and Rauschenbach (1988) found a direct relationship between 
networking and funds.  By appointing a corporate executive to a nonprofit’s board, the 
agency benefits from an increase in funds, not only from the executive’s corporation, but 
also from agencies in the corporation’s network. 
It is possible that these relationships between the corporate world and the 
nonprofit world are symbiotic.  The corporation benefits in this interaction in that not 
only does the corporation gain a potential tax incentive but it also gains a favorable 
reputation among the public.  The corporation is seen as a philanthropic entity rather than 
a profit-seeking entity.  The nonprofit agency benefits from additional access to funding 
opportunities.  The agency receives direct contributions from the corporation as well as 
the potential for further contributions from related corporations.  Relationships with for-
profit agencies imply access to corporate funds. 
The collection of such ties leads to collaboration.  Zinn, et al. (1997) found that 
depending upon size, organizations collaborate with other similar agencies in a variety of 
manners.  In their study, smaller hospitals engaged in formal connections such as joint 
ventures and mergers.  Larger hospitals engaged in informal manners such as information 
sharing and client referral.  Their findings correspond to resource dependency in that 
smaller organizations were subject to greater resource scarcity.  Scarcity resulted in the 
need to establish formal connections to gain access to needed resources.  Organizations 
with larger budgets are not subject to scarcity and therefore do not need to rely upon 
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formal collaboration.  Characteristics of the organization, such as size, determined the 
type of collaboration. 
Zinn et al.’s (1997) findings were contrary to Guo and Acar’s (2005) who found 
that organizations with larger budgets and a greater reliance upon government funding 
engaged in more formal collaboration activities.  They also found that organizations with 
more board linkages to other organizations engaged in more formal collaborations.  It is 
possible that a formal collaboration is more likely to be reported in outlets such as annual 
reports and company website pages.  Regardless of the type of collaboration, the 
characteristics of the environment have an effect on an organization’s size and how the 
organization interacts with its community.  Reliance upon resources impacts the way in 
which organizations behave.   
Summary 
In this survey of the literature, resource dependency theory was used to explain 
aspects of how an organization forms and interacts in its environment.  The resources that 
an organization rely upon impacts the behavior of the organization.  A nonprofit 
organization is faced with uncertainty that affects how it will interact with its 
environment.  Scarcity or abundance of resources, such as finances and personnel, shape 
how an organization forms and operates.  Depending upon how an organization reacts to 
such uncertainties in the environment, it may restructure its priorities ultimately leading 
to an organizational change.  Nonprofits facing scarce resources navigate uncertainty 
with a variety of techniques.  One such technique includes increasing its social capital 
through the formal and informal ties of its board.  Nonprofits may appoint board 
members that have a significant amount of ties to government agencies and other 
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nonprofits.  Nonprofits may also seek board members with ties to for-profit agencies to 
cultivate potential funding sources.  The degree of embeddedness in a web of funders 
may play a role in the nonprofit agency’s viability. 
In the following chapter, the concepts and effects of resource dependency are 
linked to the relationship ties that a board has to not only government but to other 
entities.  Relationships become a resource that an organization relies upon to secure 
funding, a more tangible resource for operations. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
This study proposed the hypothesis that board members of nonprofits with a 
greater number of relationship ties, controlling for other variables, are expected to receive 
more funds from a government agency.  The ties measured include previous experience 
in government agencies, previous experience at another nonprofit (either as a board 
member or as an employee), previous experience at a for-profit agency, previous 
experience at a university, and previous membership in professional associations.  
Relationship ties were measured with archival online data sources including LinkedIn 
résumés (LinkedIn, 2016), Marquis Who’s Who profiles (Marquis Who’s Who Ventures, 
2016), and website biographies of board members.  The number of unique government, 
nonprofit, for-profit, and academic agencies, nonprofit board appointments, and 
professional associations, as well as the amount of years at each listed agency, were 
collected as indicators of strength and breadth of relationships.  Various organizational 
and financial variables such as the size of the organization and the amount of revenue 
during a fiscal year were also considered. 
Government Ties 
This work proposed that board members with a greater amount of relationship ties 
to government granting agencies have a greater likelihood of obtaining government 
funding.  The increased likelihood comes as a result of legitimacy and a reputation that 
the nonprofit can utilize funds in the most efficient and effective manner (Milward & 
Provan, 2000; O’Toole, 2014; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  Ties to government agencies 
allow organizations to access information such as upcoming granting opportunities (Guo 
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& Acar, 2005).  Such ties may also allow the organization opportunities to network with 
associated individuals who either influenced decisions on granting or had other 
connections to individuals with influence (Pfeffer, 1987).  Board members with no 
network ties to a funding agency were at a disadvantage in that their agency was not an 
established and reputable provider with the funder (Milward & Provan, 2000; O’Toole, 
2014).  In such cases, the agency did not necessarily have a negative reputation with 
officials so much as there was either no or little established history with government 
authorities.   
In addition to reputation and legitimacy, ties to government may facilitate the 
ability to communicate with granting authorities about techniques used for successful 
grant applications as well as upcoming funding announcements (Harlan & Saidel, 1994; 
Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer, 1973).  Communication with government agencies provided 
information to the organization about potential current and future opportunities over and 
above official government granting postings (Harlan & Saidel, 1994; Pfeffer, 1973).   
Communication was done either formally or informally (Guo & Acar, 2005; Oh, 
Chung, & Labianca, 2004; Westphal et al., 2006).  Formal communications could be 
either through direct requests for funding or agency promotion at official meetings.  
Informal communication may occur as a result of chance conversations in the course of 
conducting other business functions.  Those agencies with previous ties to government 
agencies are more likely to have opportunities to possess formal and informal 
communication as opposed to agencies with no connections to government (Guo & Acar, 
2005; Oh, Chung, & Labianca, 2004; Westphal et al., 2006).  As with government and all 
connections described later, proximity to officials assumes a tie further increasing the 
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chances of formal and informal communication (Borgatti, et al., 2009).  Proximity is the 
shortest path between two individuals in a network.  Therefore, ties to government 
facilitated obtaining grant funds. 
Nonprofit Ties   
Similar to research that suggested interpersonal connections increase the 
likelihood of funding (Harland & Saidel, 1994; Li & Schurhoff, 2012; Marlowe, 2013; 
Pfeffer, 1973; Westphal et al., 2006), ties to other organizations seemed to imply 
connections as well.  Participation within a network provided access to industry practices 
and information about funding opportunities (Guo & Acar, 2005).  Network participation 
also increased legitimacy of the nonprofit further increasing chances of funding 
(O’Toole, 2014; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  In this example, board members of one 
nonprofit connected to board members of another nonprofit were likely to receive more 
funds as a result of increased legitimacy and information sharing about funding 
opportunities (Guo & Acar, 2005; O’Toole, 2014; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  Following 
this logic, the number of ties that a board member possessed determined the magnitude of 
funding.  A board member with more ties to other nonprofits had a greater chance to 
receive information from a wide range of sources (Granovetter, 1973).  A greater number 
of connections also meant that funders viewed the board member and his/her agency as a 
more legitimate provider of services (O’Toole, 2014; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
Therefore, ties to other nonprofits facilitated obtaining grant funding. 
There were a number of ways connections to other nonprofit agencies were 
captured.  Ties within the nonprofit network increased access to funding information as 
well as embeddedness and legitimacy (Granovetter, 1985; O’Toole, 2014; Pfeffer and 
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Salancik, 1978).  Nonprofit ties were captured by examining previous work experience 
with other nonprofit agencies, and board appointments to other nonprofits.  As with 
government ties, the number of ties to another nonprofit that a board member had through 
previous employment served as an indicator of the amount of access to other nonprofits 
in a network.  Employment with other nonprofit agencies including serving on another 
nonprofit board increased the likelihood of access to multiple ties within the nonprofit 
sector.  In order to establish ties to other nonprofit organizations, Guo & Acar (2005) 
measured linkages by counting the number of board members who served on the boards 
of other nonprofits.  Linkages came with employment at another nonprofit as with 
government employment aside from appointment to a nonprofit board.   
Universities 
Ties to a nonprofit network not only came through service oriented agencies, but 
also through nonprofit universities.  Universities are a distinct subset of the nonprofit 
sector that provide abundant opportunities for relationship building.  Universities can also 
be significant stakeholders in the healthcare profession (Lewis, 2006).  In the case of 
community healthcare, smaller facilities that seemed to operate as an independent entity 
were in fact a part of a larger university affiliated medical network.  Smaller facilities 
also received information such as administrative and financial information from larger 
universities.  Board members of smaller facilities that had ties to larger research 
universities were more likely to have greater access to funding information thus 
increasing the likelihood of grant funding.  In the same manner as ties to nonprofits, ties 
to universities obtained from social network sites reflected the distinct nonprofit 
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experience gained from academia.  Such experience increased information sharing and 
legitimacy (O’Toole, 2014; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
Professional Associations 
Ties leading to potential funding also came from membership in professional 
associations.  Membership in professional associations were another way in which 
nonprofit employees had access to connections to other employees in a field.  Meetings 
of professional associations provided outlets for individuals to communicate formally and 
informally to obtain information about potential funding sources.  Opportunities for 
formal communication included steering committee meetings, trainings, and research 
conferences.  Informal communication opportunities included professional mixers and 
charity drives.  Such associations provided access to a variety of professionals in 
government and nonprofit industries.  Membership in a professional association such as 
the American Medical Association, the American College of Healthcare Executives, or a 
local nonprofit professional organization were examples in which individuals accessed 
lines of communication.  Other professional associations that were counted were civic 
focused (i.e. a local Rotary Club).  While this measure was by no means definitive of a 
network tie, the likelihood of network ties with other professionals was stronger when the 
individual was a member of a professional association (Guo & Acar, 2005; O’Toole, 
2014; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  When board members shared the same memberships in 
professional associations as other board members and government officials, the 
likelihood of connection was larger due to proximity (Borgatti et al., 2009).  
Memberships in the same associations assumed a tie via proximity. 
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For-Profit Ties 
As with nonprofit ties, measuring experience obtained from for-profit agencies 
allowed further information into a board member’s connections.  Having ties to a for-
profit agency such as a large corporation provided direct access to funding opportunities 
through donations and contributions.  Research supported the connection between 
corporate contributions and board appointment (Galaskiewicz & Rauschenbach, 1988).  
In an indirect manner, connections with for-profit agencies led to connections to other 
individuals that were linked to government and nonprofit agencies.  Particularly with 
large conglomerates, it was likely that a corporation conducted business with a variety of 
government and nonprofit agencies.  Governments and large nonprofits collaborated and 
contracted with for-profit agencies for service opportunities.  In this study, for-profit 
agencies were identified as any agency that did not file an IRS 990 (Internal Revenue 
Service, 2015) and, therefore, were not tax exempt.    
Measurement of Ties 
Ties were empirically tested by examining the number of mentions of previous 
employment in an agency obtained from a professional biography such as a LinkedIn 
profile (LinkedIn, 2016).  While ties were not necessarily as a result of previous 
employment, the odds of formal and informal communications increased when an 
employee at a nonprofit agency held former employment at another agency.  
Communication with a former employer was facilitated with a previous employee 
particularly if the person separated from the former employer on good terms.  The 
number of agencies in which a board member held employment served as an indicator of 
the amount of access to which a nonprofit had to other agencies.  For instance, if a board 
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member had in the past been employed by three or four government agencies, it was 
likely that the nonprofit had a stronger tie to government funding sources than an 
organization with board members without any previous government employment.  With a 
greater number of ties to a variety of agencies, the employee was able to draw upon 
different sources for potentially novel information (Granovetter, 1973).  Facilitation of 
communication theoretically increased as the number of previous employment 
appointments at other agencies increased.  Employment in different agencies increased 
the likelihood of access to multiple ties to funding agencies.   
In addition to the number of ties to agencies, the strength of the ties was important 
to consider.  The strength of the ties was measured by examining the length of 
employment in each agency mentioned.  For every mention in a biography, the number of 
years was an indicator of strength.  One board member with thirty years of experience at 
an agency indicated a stronger tie to that agency in comparison to a board member with 
five years of experience.  By also capturing the amount of years of experience in each 
agency, it was possible to establish the strength of ties that was not captured simply by 
the number of agencies.  For instance, one board member with thirty years of experience 
at one government agency (1 x 30) had a stronger overall tie than one board member with 
three years of experience at five government agencies (3 x 5).  Longevity at one agency 
allowed an individual to develop multiple yet repeated connections.  Repeated 
interactions were an indication of a strong tie over and above the volume of different ties.  
The number and length of ties of each board member were totaled to obtain an 
aggregated number and length for each of the six relationship tie categories for an 
organization.  The summation of all ties of the board went into a total aggregate 
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organizational tie for each category.  Boards were expected to act as a single entity to 
decide the action of the organization.  Thus, aggregating individual board member data 
into one organizational data point for the number of total ties and one point for the total 
years of ties served to reflect the singular action of the entire board.  All affiliations were 
added from LinkedIn (LinkedIn, 2016), Marquis Who’s Who profiles (Marquis Who’s 
Who Ventures, 2016), and biographies from agency websites into the organizational data.  
In cases where a board member had data from both LinkedIn (LinkedIn, 2016) and 
Who’s Who (Marquis Who’s Who Ventures, 2016) sources, the one data source with the 
most comprehensive information was considered to avoid any potential multiple 
inclusions of associations.   
Other Variables 
Additionally, organizational and financial variables such as previous granting 
activity were considered.  Organizational and financial variables such as the number of 
employees, incoming contributions, and assets may have an effect on funding apart from 
relationship ties.  In total, there were five financial variables in this model:  total assets, 
total revenue, previous grant revenue, contributions, and grants to government.  There 
were also three organizational variables:  the number of board members, the number of 
employees, and the number of volunteers.   
Additional Financial Variables  
Additional financial variables were considered as potential variables that affected 
funding.  In order to capture not only the size of the organization but also the financial 
capability of an organization, data on the total assets and the total revenue that an 
organization reported on the IRS 990 tax return (Internal Revenue Service, 2015) during 
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a fiscal year was collected.  Organizations with lower amounts of total assets and total 
revenue may have been under greater financial stress which affected the chance of 
funding.  Governments may deem financially stressed organizations as a risky investment 
and therefore may bias funding decisions.  To control for biased funding decision 
making, assets and revenue were incorporated into the theoretical model.   
Building from Marlowe (2013) and Li and Schurhoff (2012), financial 
transactions were used as a method of creating a network analysis among banks and bond 
writers.  It was assumed that previous granting activity was a good indication of a 
network tie as a government agency would not grant funds to an unknown organization.  
By having an established history between a nonprofit and a government granting entity, a 
tie existed based upon a reputation of positive performance.  In order to account for 
established history, a dichotomous variable was created in the database reflecting whether 
an organization received funding prior to 2008.  Creating an historical variable allowed 
for the comparison of outcomes between organizations that had an established grant 
history with the funder from organizations with no prior funding history. 
Aside from grants, nonprofits received revenue from other nonprofits and 
individuals through contributions.  While contributions may not directly contribute to an 
organization’s relationship to government and other nonprofit entities, such revenue 
sources can affect the amount of grant revenue that an agency receives.  Receiving 
sufficient amounts of contributions may deter an organization from applying for grants.  
In this case, nonprofits with sufficient amounts of contributions may lack the need for 
grant funding.  The effect that contributions had on the likelihood of acquiring a grant 
therefore was considered in the model.   
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A nonprofit that granted to a government entity may do so for a variety of 
reasons.  The presence of a grant to a government established a relationship tie in that the 
nonprofit agreed to trust a government agency in some aspect of its mission.  As an 
example, an agency may grant money to a local fire department for ambulance services to 
the agency’s facilities. The agency may also grant money to a local police department for 
security services.  Grant expenditures, in this case, may also bias federal granting 
decision outcomes in a number of manners.  For instance, agencies that granted to local 
governments may be viewed as pass-through agencies which can affect the chances of 
funding either positively or negatively.  In any case, granting decisions were not 
unbiased. 
Additional Organizational Variables 
Additional organizational variables were considered as potential influences on 
funding.  The size of an organization’s board can affect an agency’s likelihood of 
acquiring revenue.  Larger organizations may have greater human and social resources to 
draw upon for grant application and fundraising efforts.  Conversely, smaller 
organizations have fewer employees to dedicate time and effort to obtaining operational 
revenue.  Smaller organizations may also have fewer individuals with connections to 
granting authorities putting the agency at a disadvantage in comparison to a larger 
organization.  An organization with a large number of board members and employees 
were likely to have more relationship ties to a greater number of decision makers.   
Two other variables capturing the size of the organization were the number of 
employees and the number of volunteers.  As previously stated, larger organizations may 
have more human capital to draw upon in establishing connections for future funding.  As 
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an additional consideration, larger organizations had more operational functions which 
increased the need for external funding.  It was for these reasons that size was considered 
as they can affect grant likelihood apart from organizational ties.  For an abridged listing 
of all variables, see Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1:  Abridged list and definition of variables. 
 
Variable 
Relationship Ties 
Percentage of Board Members with Government Ties 
Number of Government Ties 
Years of Government Ties 
Percentage of Board Members with Nonprofit Ties 
Number of Nonprofit Ties 
Years of Nonprofit Ties 
Percentage of Board Members with Board Appointments at Another Nonprofit 
Number of Board Appointments at Another Nonprofit 
Years as a Board Member at Another Nonprofit 
Percentage of Board Members with Professional Association Memberships 
Number of Professional Associations 
Years as a Member of Professional Association 
Percentage of Board Members with University Ties 
Number of University Ties 
Years of University Ties 
Percentage of Board Members with For-profit Ties 
Number of For-profit Ties 
Years of For-profit Ties 
Financial Variables 
Total Revenue 
Total Assets 
Total Contributions 
Previous Grant Revenue 
Previous Grant Expenditure to Government 
HRSA Grants Prior to 2008 
Organizational Variables 
Number of Board Members 
Number of Employees 
Number of Volunteers 
 
 
Hypothesis 
Given the research, nonprofits with strong ties to other agencies should have a 
greater likelihood of securing government grants.  In this study, the ties that an 
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organization as a whole had to a granting agency were examined instead of the ties that 
individual board members had.  The board members as a whole decided the mission and 
objectives of the nonprofit organization.  The board as a whole served as the face of the 
organization.  If individual ties to a granting authority were the focus, it would also be 
necessary to rank the importance of the ties.  For instance, determining which individual 
on a board had the most crucial connections to a funding agency would be a difficult 
endeavor without conducting an organizational survey.  While an analysis on the 
influence of one board member would provide information on the power structure of the 
board members and the leadership characteristics of a single member, the focus of the 
current proposal was to consider the board as a single entity.  Analyzing ties utilizing the 
organization as a unit of measure was only one way to quantify relationships.   
Hypothesis:  Nonprofits with a greater number of relationship ties, controlling for 
appropriate variables, will receive more funds from a government agency. 
Grant funding became a function of relationship ties, organizational variables, and 
financial variables.  Relationship ties were the addition of experiences and appointments 
of each board member (Figure 3.1).   
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Figure 3.1:  Relationship of Board Members, Organizational Ties, and Government 
Funding. 
 
  
Summary 
This study hypothesized that board members of nonprofits with a greater number 
of relationship ties, controlling for other variables, were expected to receive more funds 
from a government agency.  A greater number of ties, as well as a greater amount of time 
building ties, were theorized to increase the chance of future funding for a nonprofit 
organization.  Ties measured in this study included previous work experience in 
government agencies, previous work experience at another nonprofit, previous 
appointment to another nonprofit board, previous work experience at a for-profit agency, 
previous work experience at a university, and previous membership in professional 
 
 
Board Member A 
Government Ties 
Nonprofit Ties 
Other Association Ties 
Board Member B 
Government Ties 
Nonprofit Ties 
Other Association Ties 
Board Member C 
Government Ties 
Nonprofit Ties 
Other Association Ties 
Historical Variables 
Financial Variables 
Organizational Variables 
Relationship Variables Government Funding 
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associations.  Relationship ties were measured by examining LinkedIn résumés 
(LinkedIn, 2016), Marquis Who’s Who profiles (Marquis Who’s Who Ventures, 2016), 
and agency website biographies of board members.  The number of unique government, 
nonprofit, for-profit, and academic agencies, nonprofit board appointments, and 
professional associations were considered, as well as the number of years at each listed 
agency.  Each of these were viewed as indicators of breadth and strength of relationships.  
Other organizational and financial variables that affected funding were also reviewed.  
There were five financial variables in this model:  total assets, total revenue, previous 
grant revenue, contributions, and grants to government.  There were three organizational 
variables:  board size, organizational size, and volunteer size. 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY 
 
In this study, the relationship ties of 176 community healthcare nonprofit 
organizations over the span of five fiscal years (2008-2012) were examined.  This 
methodology allowed for the examination of longitudinal and cross-sectional data to 
determine if board appointments in one year affected funding for the following year.  
Board member names, financial data, and organizational data from IRS 990 forms 
(Internal Revenue Service, 2015), funding outcomes from HRSA databases, and 
relationship ties data from board members’ LinkedIn (LinkedIn, 2016) and Marquis 
Who’s Who (Marquis Who’s Who Ventures, 2016) profiles were collected. 
All information acquired was public record and did not require direct contact with 
any organization.  Data was stored on a password protected computer and server.  As a 
result of such factors, approval from an institutional review board was not required.  No 
ethical violations resulted from the collection and reporting of data. 
Nonprofit healthcare organization selection  
Since the number of nonprofits in the United States is sizable, the scope of the 
research was narrowed to nonprofit healthcare organizations receiving federal funds.  
Healthcare organizations, such as clinics, were chosen due to both the expected increase 
in health care utilization and to control for organizational scope. 
Lists of nonprofit organizations were obtained via the IRS Exempt Organizations 
Business Master File (EO BMF) (Internal Revenue Service, 2014).  The EO BMF 
database contained all U.S. organizations that were approved for tax-exempt status and 
therefore classified as a nonprofit organization.  Organizations were selected based on 
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three criteria:  geographic region, scope of the organization, and asset amounts.  Selection 
was limited to these criteria in an effort to maintain as much similarity among 
organizations as possible.  To control for geographic region, the selection focused on the 
Mid-Atlantic/Midwest region to include the following 19 states: Delaware, District of 
Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.  To select for organizational scope in order to 
ensure that all organizations shared similar operations, the IRS National Taxonomy of 
Exempt Entities (NTEE) was used to select a code which categorized nonprofit 
organizations by operational similarities.  Organizations with an NTEE code of E32 – 
Ambulatory Health Clinics and Community Health Centers were utilized.  Finally, assets 
were used as an indicator of organizational size and patient intake.  Utilizing the asset 
codes of 6 and 7, organizations with a reported asset portfolio between $1 million and 
$10 million were selected.  With all selection criteria in place, there were a total of 176 
organizations in the population pool.   
Funding source 
A major source of federal funding for all healthcare organizations comes from the 
Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) bureau under the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services.  HRSA is the primary federal agency 
designated for the purposes of improving health outcomes and reducing health disparities.  
The agency accomplishes these goals by providing funding for services and training for 
health care professionals (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2016a).  
HRSA grants fund a variety of healthcare initiatives including but not limited to:  health 
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workforce, HIV/AIDS, maternal and child health, primary care/health centers, rural 
health, and organ donation (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2016b).  
The funds examined in this study were competitive and were designed for programmatic 
purposes as detailed in the grant narrative.  In this study, all available HRSA funds 
granted to community healthcare centers were included.  For a listing of represented 
grants, see Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1:  Represented HRSA Grants Awarded to Sampled Organizations (Health 
Resources and Services Administration, 2014). 
 
Program Name 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) Grants for School-Based Health Centers Capital Program 
Affordable Care Act – Health Center Planning Grants 
Affordable Care Act Patient Centered Medical Home - Facility Improvements Grant Program 
Affordable Care Act Teaching Health Center (THC) Graduate Medical Education (GME) Payment 
Program 
Affordable Care Act: Nurse Managed Health Clinics 
ARRA - Capital Improvement Program 
ARRA - Facility Investment Program 
ARRA - Health Information Technology Implementation 
ARRA - Increased Demand for Services 
ARRA - New Access Points 
Behavioral Health Workforce Education and Training for Professionals and Paraprofessionals 
Capital Development 
Congressionally-Mandated Health Information Technology Grants 
Health Care and Other Facilities 
Health Center Controlled Networks 
Health Center Program 
Health Information Technology (HIT) Planning Grants 
Health Information Technology Innovation Initiative 
Health Infrastructure Investment Programs 
Healthy Start Initiative-Eliminating Racial/Ethnic Disparities 
Patient Navigator Outreach and Chronic Disease Prevention Program 
Rural Health Care Services Outreach Grant Program 
Rural Health Network Development Planning Grant Program 
Rural Health Network Development Program 
Rural Health Outreach Special Initiative 
Ryan White Part C Outpatient EIS Program 
Ryan White Title III HIV Capacity Development and Planning Grants 
Ryan White Title IV Women, Infants, Children, Youth and Affected Family Members AIDS Healthcare 
Sickle Cell Treatment Demonstration Program 
Small Health Care Provider Quality Improvement 
Special Projects of National Significance 
State and Regional Primary Care Associations 
The Community Based Doula Program 
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In this study, the summation of all HRSA funds received by the sampled 
organizations during fiscal years 2009 to 2013 served as a dependent variable.  The 
granted funds database was filtered by state to obtain all funded agencies for all 176 
identified organizations.  The funding amount was used to examine the magnitude of 
funding from HRSA for each sampled nonprofit. 
As a result of the effects of previous granting activities, an historical variable was 
created by capturing funding prior to the examined time frame.  A variable that 
distinguished between agencies that received HRSA funds prior to 2008 from agencies 
that did not receive HRSA funds was included (1 = received HRSA funds prior to 2008; 
0 = did not receive HRSA funds prior to 2008). 
Time period 
The relationship ties of the board members, as well as the financial and 
organizational variables of all sampled agencies, was lagged for fiscal years 2008 to 
2012.  HRSA funding data was collected from fiscal years 2009 to 2013.    To examine 
the effect on one fiscal year, financial and organizational variables and the relationship 
ties of the board for the previous fiscal year were examined.  For example, an agency’s 
board composition and relationship ties for fiscal year 2008 were used to determine 
predictive effects on HRSA funding for fiscal year 2009.  Since government funding 
decisions are typically determined a fiscal year in advance, the decisions of a board from 
a previous fiscal year determines budgetary priorities for the following fiscal year.   
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Board Member and Management Selection 
For the 176 selected organizations, the names of the board members and the upper 
management, such as the CEO, were obtained from IRS 990 tax returns submitted by 
each organization (Internal Revenue Service, 2015).  The IRS 990 form contains the 
names of board members and upper management in Part VII of the IRS 990 (Internal 
Revenue Service, 2015).  The IRS 990 forms for fiscal years 2008 to 2012 were reviewed 
to obtain board member names.  Since financial data for fiscal years 2009 to 2013 was 
collected, the composition of the board and upper management from 2008 to 2012 had 
the most direct effect on 2009 to 2013 operations.   
For board members that appeared in multiple fiscal years, the number and length 
of ties in relationship to the year of funding was considered.  As an example, a board 
member had one tie lasting eleven years in 2010.  The board member’s data point in 2009 
was coded as 1 tie lasting 10 years, and, in 2010, the point was coded as 1 tie lasting 11 
years.  
Relationship Ties 
Information was collected for each board member and upper management official 
listed for a nonprofit.  This included information about relationship ties obtained from 
archival online data.  An indirect analysis focused upon affiliation to federal government 
officials, other nonprofit organizations, and membership in professional associations 
without utilizing direct contact with agency officials.  An analysis of archival data 
allowed a relationship tie score that served as an independent variable.  Data was 
obtained from a number of sources: biographies of board members and upper 
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management posted on a nonprofit’s web site, Marquis Who’s Who (Marquis Who’s 
Who Ventures, 2016), and LinkedIn profile information (LinkedIn, 2016).   
To calculate the percentage of board members with a relationship tie variable, 
existence of a mention on a profile in any of the six categories was considered a tie.  
Existence of ties in each of the six categories was considered a dichotomous variable 
(yes/no) without regard to the number of ties to differing agencies.  For example, if a 
board member had a connection to any nonprofit agency, the board member was 
considered to have a nonprofit tie and was coded as “yes” or 1.  If a board member had 
connections to several nonprofit agencies, a nonprofit connection existed and was coded 
as “yes”.  The total number of board members with a tie was calculated and divided by 
the total number of board members to obtain a percentage of members with a tie for each 
of the six categories. 
Ties were divided into six categories:  previous work experience in government, 
previous work experience at a nonprofit organization, previous nonprofit board 
appointment, previous work experience at a nonprofit university, previous work 
experience at a for-profit organization, and membership in a professional association.  
For each individual board member, his/her LinkedIn (LinkedIn, 2016) profile was 
reviewed if available.  To maintain accuracy and to ensure the correct individual’s 
information was examined, LinkedIn profiles were only used if the associated nonprofit 
organization was listed within the profile as a current or previous association.  LinkedIn 
profiles were also used if a board member’s current association was listed with the board 
member’s name on the nonprofit’s website.  For each LinkedIn profile, all prior 
governmental, nonprofit, for-profit, university, and professional association affiliations as 
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well as any available dates of active affiliation for each entry were captured.  In order to 
verify the nonprofit status of a listed organization, a GuideStar (2015) query was 
conducted.  GuideStar is an online database of nonprofit organizations.  Guidestar 
maintains IRS 990s, annual reports, and other relevant organizational and financial data 
for all registered nonprofit agencies in the United States.  When the organization listed in 
a board member’s profile did not appear in Guidestar, the organization was denoted as a 
for-profit.  This process was repeated for each board member utilizing Marquis Who’s 
Who database of noted individuals (Marquis Who’s Who Ventures, 2016).   
For each individual listed on an agency’s 990 form (Internal Revenue Service, 
2015), each work appointment or affiliation listed on a biography was considered as a 
separate tie.  Each listing was added into one of the categories serving as an independent 
variable for the number of ties.  For example, if an individual listed previous employment 
at three government agencies (X, Y, & Z), the entries were recorded as three separate 
ties.  The number of years at each listed affiliation was counted to examine the strength 
of the tie at each agency.  An individual who listed two years at Organization X, two at 
Organization Y, and five at Organization Z, was recorded as an individual with a total of 
three ties and nine years of experience.  The same methodology was used for previous 
work experience at another nonprofit, previous work experience at a nonprofit university, 
previous work experience at a for-profit organization, board appointment at another 
nonprofit, and professional membership associations.  In instances when no date was 
listed with the affiliation, the affiliation was recorded as one tie and one year of 
experience for each year the board member served.  Missing and/or non-existent data was 
recorded as 0. 
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Though ties may have existed without biographical mention, the current study 
focused on explicitly stated network ties.  Due to the nature of archival data collection, 
only ties from documented biographical sources were inferred.  Researchers have 
examined the sources of other types of formal and informal connections.  Formal ties 
may come from planned interactions in a work environment.  These types of interactions 
include meetings intended to relay information to employees (Guo & Acar, 2005) as well 
as interactions between members of work teams (Borgatti et al., 2009; Oh, Chung, & 
Labianca, 2004).  Appointments to another nonprofit board and work experience at other 
agencies captured formal connections involving structured interactions in a professional 
setting.  Informal ties arise from ‘off the record’ interactions or interactions that are 
outside of the work environment (Kratzer, Leenders, & Van Engelen, 2005; Oh, Chung, 
& Labianca, 2004).  Measuring membership in professional associations was one way to 
capture informal ties.  Although professional association meetings were not necessarily 
extracurricular, interactions at various meetings occurred outside of the workplace.  In 
many instances, professional associations were not directly related to a profession but 
were more civically oriented such as a local Rotary Club. 
In previous research (Kratzer, Leenders, & Van Engelen, 2005; Oh, Chung, & 
Labianca, 2004), formal and informal connections were obtained through interviews and 
self-administered questionnaires asking participants to detail the extent of social 
interaction among other employees in the workplace.  This research study did not utilize 
such direct measures of social interaction but relied upon the theory of proximity to infer 
social connections (Borgatti et al., 2009).  Under the theory of proximity, closeness to 
other employees implicitly corresponded to a certain level of either formal or informal 
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relationships to others in an organization.  For this study, previous work experience was 
equivalent to proximity.  As a result, due to the inference of relationship ties from 
archival data, there were limitations on the degrees of causality in this study.  While such 
limitations do not invalidate the findings of this study, acknowledgement of the nature of 
correlational relationships between funding and relationship ties must not be disregarded. 
For individuals that had service at an agency for multiple years, the tie at each 
agency for each fiscal year was considered increasing in strength.  For instance, a board 
member that served on a board in 2008 had a baseline relationship tie at the examined 
board appointment coding from the beginning of his/her career to 2008 (t).  The same 
board member serving in 2009 at the same appointment had ties from the beginning of 
his/her career to 2009 (t + 1).  The same time-dependent calculation of a tie continued to 
the stated end point or to 2012, whichever came first. 
The number and length of ties of each board member were totaled to obtain an 
aggregated number and length of time for each of the six relationship tie categories for 
the organization.  As previously stated, since boards were expected to act as a single 
entity to decide the action of the organization, aggregating individual board member data 
into one organizational data point served to reflect the singular action of the entire board.  
All affiliations were added from LinkedIn (LinkedIn, 2016) and Who’s Who (Marquis 
Who’s Who Ventures, 2016) profiles into the organizational data.  In cases where a board 
member had the same data from both LinkedIn (LinkedIn, 2016) and Who’s Who 
(Marquis Who’s Who Ventures, 2016) databases, only the database with the most 
comprehensive information was considered to avoid any potential multiple inclusions of 
associations.  In cases where two board members were connected to the same external 
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organization, each tie was counted separately as two ties.  As each board member was an 
individual and each tie carried the same weight as other ties, overlapping ties to the same 
organization demonstrated an increased connection rather than a duplication. 
Additional Financial Variables 
Additional financial variables were considered as variables that have an effect on 
funding.  As mentioned earlier, variables such as incoming revenue can affect funding 
due to organizational variations in size or expected need of additional funding.  All 
financial variables were adjusted for inflation utilizing the Consumer Price Index and 
2013 as a reference point (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016). 
Total Revenue and Total Assets 
In order to capture not only the size of the organization but also the financial 
capability of an organization, data on the total assets and the total revenue that an 
organization possessed was collected for a fiscal year.  Revenue and asset size can vary 
funding levels over and above relationship ties thus affecting the model.  To control for 
biased funding decision making, assets and revenue were included into the theoretical 
model.  Total current year revenue was collected from the IRS 990 form (Part 1, line 12) 
and total current year assets from the IRS 990 form (Part 1, line 20) (Internal Revenue 
Service, 2015).  Since HRSA revenue for a fiscal year was a part of total revenue for an 
organization, it was necessary to subtract the HRSA revenue of a fiscal year from the 
total revenue to avoid collinearity between these two variables. 
Current and Previous Grants 
As with Marlowe (2013) and Li and Schurhoff (2012), financial transactions were 
used as a method of creating a network analysis among banks and bonds writers.  Similar 
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financial information for nonprofit organizations were extracted from the IRS 990 
(Internal Revenue Service, 2015).  It was assumed that previous granting activity was a 
good indication of a network tie as it is unlikely that a government agency would grant 
funds to an unknown organization.  By having an established history between a nonprofit 
and a government granting entity, a tie existed based upon a reputation of positive 
performance.  Grant data existed as “Current and Previous Revenue from Government 
Grants” in the 2008-2012 IRS 990 form (Part VIII, line 1 e) (Internal Revenue Service, 
2015).  As with total revenue, since HRSA revenue for a fiscal year was a part of the 
grant revenue for an organization, it was necessary to subtract the HRSA revenue from 
the total grant revenue. 
Contributions 
Aside from grants, nonprofits received revenue from for-profit agencies, other 
nonprofits, and individuals through contributions.  While contributions may not directly 
contribute to an organization’s relationship to government and other nonprofit entities, 
such revenue sources can affect the amount of grant revenue that an agency receives.  
Receiving sufficient amounts of contributions to cover operational costs can deter an 
organization from applying for grants.  The effect that contributions had on the likelihood 
of acquiring a grant therefore were considered in the model.  Contribution data existed as 
“All other contributions, gifts, grants, and similar amounts” (Part VIII; line 1f) (Internal 
Revenue Service, 2015). 
Grants to Governments 
A nonprofit that grants to a government entity may do so for a variety of reasons.  
In the current analysis, the presence of a grant to a government established a relationship 
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tie in that the nonprofit agreed to trust the government with some aspect of its mission.  
As an example, a community healthcare facility granted money to a local fire department 
for ambulance services to the facility, or a facility granted money to a local police 
department for security services.  By contracting out to a local government, the nonprofit 
may access an indirect route to larger funding sources as many local governments have 
ties to federal government through other granting activities.  Additionally, by contracting 
money out, the nonprofit may be viewed as a pass-through agency which may have an 
effect on federal granting decisions.  Grant data existed as “Grants to Governments” (Part 
IX; line 1) (Internal Revenue Service, 2015). 
Additional Organizational Variables 
As with financial variables, organizational variables such as the number of 
employees were considered as potential variables that affect funding.  The number of 
board members that an organization had may impact an agency’s likelihood of acquiring 
revenue.  Larger organizations may have greater human and social resources to draw 
upon for grant application and fundraising efforts.  Conversely, smaller organizations 
have fewer employees to dedicate time and effort to obtaining operational revenue.  
Smaller organizations may also have fewer individuals with connections to granting 
authorities putting the agency at a disadvantage in comparison to a larger organization.  
An organization with a large number of board members and employees are likely to have 
more relationship ties to a greater number of decision makers.   
To capture the relationship of an organization’s size to the amount of funding, 
three variables were obtained from the IRS 990 for fiscal years 2008 to 2012 (Internal 
Revenue Service, 2015):  the number of board members, the number of employees, and 
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the number of volunteers.  For the board size, the number of voting members of the 
governing body was used (Part I, line 3).  For organizational size, the total number of 
individuals employed during the calendar year was collected (Part I, line, 5).  For 
volunteer size, the total number of volunteers was utilized (Part I, line 6) (Internal 
Revenue Service, 2015). 
In total, there were five financial variables from the 990 (Internal Revenue 
Service, 2015):  total assets, total revenue, previous grant revenue, contributions, and 
grants to government.  There were also three organizational variables from the 990 
(Internal Revenue Service, 2015):  the number of board members, the number of 
employees, and the number of volunteers.  For each of these variables, the magnitude of 
funding was captured from the reported amounts for each of these variables.  Any data 
with zero indicated no revenue or expenses in granted activity.  Missing data was counted 
as zero as it was assumed with any IRS form that the absence of data indicated zero.  For 
a detailed listing of all variables, see Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2:  Detailed List and Definition of Variables. 
 
Variable Definition of Variable 
Number of Government Ties All unique listings of Federal, state, or local 
government employment as listed in biographical 
description of board member or upper management.  
Descriptions obtained from LinkedIn (LinkedIn, 2016), 
Marquis Who’s Who (Marquis Who’s Who Ventures, 
2016), and the agency’s web site. 
Years of Government Ties The number of years of employment at each unique 
government listing obtained above.  Years counted 
are from start date to year of measurement.  Listings 
with no years listed are coded as 1. 
Number of Nonprofit Ties All unique listings of employment at nonprofit (not 
current agency) as listed in biographical description of 
board member or upper management.  Nonprofit 
status certified via Guidestar.org (Guidestar, 2015).  
Descriptions obtained from LinkedIn (LinkedIn, 2016), 
Marquis Who’s Who (Marquis Who’s Who Ventures, 
2016), and the agency’s web site. 
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Table 4.2 (continued) 
 
 
Years of Nonprofit Ties The number of years of employment at each unique 
nonprofit listing obtained above.  Years counted are 
from start date to year of measurement.  Listings with 
no years listed are coded as 1. 
Number of Board Appointments 
at Different Nonprofit Agency 
Each unique listing of board appointment at nonprofit 
(not current agency) as listed in biographical 
description of board member or upper management.  
Listing must explicitly state board appointment.  
Nonprofit status certified via Guidestar.org (Guidestar, 
2015).  Descriptions obtained from LinkedIn (LinkedIn, 
2016), Marquis Who’s Who (Marquis Who’s Who 
Ventures, 2016), and the agency’s web site. 
Years as a Board Member at 
Another Nonprofit 
The number of years of board appointment at each 
unique nonprofit listing obtained above.  Years 
counted are from start date to year of measurement.  
Listings with no years listed are coded as 1. 
Number of Professional 
Associations 
All unique listings of membership in a national, state, 
or local professional association as listed in 
biographical description of board member or upper 
management.  Descriptions obtained from LinkedIn 
(LinkedIn, 2016), Marquis Who’s Who (Marquis Who’s 
Who Ventures, 2016), and the agency’s web site. 
Years as a Member of 
Professional Association 
The number of years as member of each professional 
association listing obtained above.  Years counted are 
from start date to year of measurement.  Listings with 
no years listed are coded as 1. 
Number of University Ties All unique listings of employment at a nonprofit 
university as listed in biographical description of board 
member or upper management.  Nonprofit status 
certified via Guidestar.org (Guidestar, 2015).  
Descriptions obtained from LinkedIn (LinkedIn, 2016), 
Marquis Who’s Who (Marquis Who’s Who Ventures, 
2016), and the agency’s web site. 
Years of University Ties The number of years of employment at each unique 
nonprofit university listing obtained above.  Years 
counted are from start date to year of measurement.  
Listings with no years listed are coded as 1. 
Number of For-profit Ties All unique listings of employment at a for-profit agency 
as listed in biographical description of board member 
or upper management.  For-profit status certified via 
Guidestar.org (Guidestar, 2015).  Descriptions 
obtained from LinkedIn (LinkedIn, 2016), Marquis 
Who’s Who (Marquis Who’s Who Ventures, 2016), 
and the agency’s web site. 
Years of For-profit Ties The number of years of employment at each unique 
for-profit agency listing obtained above.  Years 
counted are from start date to year of measurement.  
Listings with no years listed are coded as 1. 
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Table 4.2 (continued) 
 
 
Total Revenue The total amount of contributions, grants, program 
service revenue, investment income, and other 
revenue received by an agency (sans HRSA revenue) 
as listed in IRS 990 form (Internal Revenue Service, 
2015).  Line item: “Total revenue”, Part I, line 12. 
Total Assets The total amount of cash, savings, pledges, accounts 
receivable, grants receivable, investments, and other 
short-term and long-term assets as listed in IRS 990 
form (Internal Revenue Service, 2015).  Line item: 
“Total assets”, Part 1, line 20. 
Total Contributions The total amount of contributions, gifts, non-
government grants, and other smaller amounts 
received as listed in IRS 990 form (Internal Revenue 
Service, 2015).  Line item: “All other contributions…” 
Part VIII, line 1f. 
Previous Grant Revenue Amount of grants received in previous fiscal (sans 
HRSA revenue) as listed in IRS 990 form (Internal 
Revenue Service, 2015).  Line item: “Current and 
Previous Revenue from Government Grants”, Part 
VIII, line 1e. 
Previous Grant Expenditure to 
Government 
Amount of expenditures in the form of grants from 
agency to government in previous fiscal as listed in 
IRS 990 form (Internal Revenue Service, 2015).  Line 
item: “Grants to Governments”, Part IX, line 1. 
HRSA Funds Prior to 2008 Dichotomous variable (1 = yes; 0 = no) of presence of 
a HRSA fund obtained prior to 2008.  Obtained from 
HRSA funding sources database. 
Number of Board Members The number of board members as listed in IRS 990 
form (Internal Revenue Service, 2015).  Line item: 
“Number of voting members of the governing body”, 
Part I, line 3 
Number of Employees The number of employees as listed in IRS 990 form 
(Internal Revenue Service, 2015).  Line item: “Total 
number of individuals employed in a calendar year”, 
Part I, line 5. 
Number of Volunteers The number of volunteers as listed in IRS 990 form 
(Internal Revenue Service, 2015).  Line item: “Total 
number of volunteers”, Part I, line 6. 
 
 
Summary 
A number of variables for 176 community healthcare nonprofit organizations 
were examined over the span of five fiscal years.  Relationship ties were obtained from 
LinkedIn (LinkedIn, 2016), Marquis Who’s Who profiles (Marquis Who’s Who 
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Ventures, 2016), and agency websites.  The relationship ties under consideration included 
previous work experience in a government agency, previous work experience in another 
nonprofit agency, previous work experience in a for-profit agency, previous work 
experience at a university, previous board appointment at another nonprofit, and 
membership in a professional association.  For each relationship tie category, the number 
of ties and the length of time for each tie was collected.  A series of financial variables 
were obtained from each agency’s IRS 990 forms (Internal Revenue Service, 2015).  The 
financial variables under consideration included total assets, total revenue, revenue from 
government grants, revenue from contributions, and grant expenditures.  HRSA funds 
received prior to 2008 served as an historical variable.  Finally, organizational variables 
were obtained from IRS 990 forms (Internal Revenue Service, 2015).  Organizational 
variables included the number of board members, the number of employees, and the 
number of volunteers.  For all considered independent variables, information was 
collected for fiscal years 2008 to 2012.  The amount of HRSA funding that nonprofit 
healthcare agencies received was collected for fiscal years 2009 to 2013.  The mixture of 
the mentioned variables of one fiscal year was examined as a function of the amount of 
HRSA funds granted for the following fiscal year. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS 
 
Organizations with more relationship ties were expected to have a greater 
likelihood of HRSA funding acquisition.  It was expected that there would be a positive 
relationship between the number and length of all ties and the amount of funding 
received.  In particular, government ties were expected to have a positive relationship 
with predicted HRSA funding.  Agencies that previously received HRSA grants were 
more likely to receive future HRSA grants.   
The following section details the econometric models used to test the hypothesis.  
T-tests were conducted to determine any statistically significant differences between 
funded and unfunded agencies.  A probit regression was used to determine the likelihood 
of obtaining funding.  Multiple regressions were used as a way to test the hypothesis.  A 
series of non-panel regressions was conducted in order to test for general model 
significance and to build models to use for panel data regressions.  The initial non-panel 
regressions allowed for the examination of any possible mediating connections.  Finally, 
panel data regressions were conducted to compare fixed and between effects to determine 
any longitudinal and cross-sectional influences on the sampled agencies.   
There were a series of mixed findings to partially support the hypothesis.  A 
number of variables were significant only when board members were in organizations 
receiving HRSA funding prior to 2008.  
In this study, an observation was defined as one fiscal year of organizational, 
financial, and relationship ties data for each of the 176 organizations.  There were five 
observations for each organization during fiscal years 2008 to 2012.  Overall, there were 
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880 observations; 363 of which were funded by HRSA during 2008-2012 and 517 of 
which were not funded by HRSA. 
Descriptive T-tests 
T-tests determined if there were statistically significant differences between the 
means of the independent variables comparing funded and unfunded observations.  There 
were twelve independent variables that were significantly different between the two 
groups:  the number of board members, the number of volunteers, the number of 
employees, incoming grant revenue, incoming contributions, the percentage of board 
members with ties to other nonprofit agencies, the total years of ties to other nonprofit 
agencies, the total years of ties to other for-profit agencies, the total number of 
professional association memberships, the total years of professional association 
memberships, the percentage of board members with ties to other nonprofit boards, and 
the total number of appointments to other nonprofit boards. (Table 5.1). 
When comparing organizational characteristics, funded and unfunded agencies 
differed in all three variables.  Funded agencies had more board members (12 versus 11), 
fewer volunteers (8 versus 110), and more employees (95 versus 65).  For financial 
variables, funded agencies received more grant revenue other than HRSA grants 
($600,000 versus $300,000) but fewer contributions ($500,000 versus $1 million).  When 
comparing relationship ties, funded agencies had a greater percentage of board members 
with ties to other nonprofit agencies (37.3% versus 32.8%).  The length of time of ties to 
other nonprofit and for-profit agencies differed as well.  Funded agencies had board 
members with longer ties to other nonprofit agencies (42.5 years versus 38.3 years) and 
fewer years of ties to for-profit agencies (47.3 years versus 54.2 years).  Funded agencies 
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had board members with fewer memberships in professional associations (8 versus 9) yet 
longer memberships in professional associations (23.2 years versus 17.8 years).  Finally, 
funded agencies had a smaller percentage of board members with ties to other nonprofit 
boards (17.1% versus 20.3%).  Subsequently, funded agencies had fewer appointments to 
other nonprofit boards (5 versus 7) (Table 5.1).   
On average, HRSA funded agencies tended to have more board members than 
agencies not receiving funds.  Of equal significance was the difference in the number of 
employees as well as the number of volunteers.  Nonprofits that were funded have 
significantly less volunteers while having more employees.  It is possible that nonprofits 
with a greater amount of payroll expenses to cover operational costs were in greater need 
of external funds and therefore more likely to apply for grant funding.  Those that were 
unfunded may cover operational functions through the use of unpaid volunteers.   
With financial variables, agencies that received funds had a significant amount of 
incoming grant revenue as opposed to those agencies not receiving HRSA funds.  HRSA 
funded agencies also received fewer contributions.  The difference in contribution 
revenue for unfunded agencies may be correlated to the fiscal situation of the 
organization.  Nonprofits that did not receive HRSA grant funds may be in a situation 
where operational costs were covered by contributions.  What was striking was that none 
of these differences existed when considering total assets and total revenues of both 
groups of nonprofit organizations.   
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Table 5.1:  Means of Each Variable 
 
 
When considering relationship ties, board members at HRSA funded agencies had 
longer relationship ties to other nonprofit agencies than for-profit agencies.  In 
consideration of these findings, it was possible that those agencies that received HRSA 
funds spent a greater deal of time cultivating ties to other nonprofits in an effort to build 
ties and legitimacy in the nonprofit realm as opposed to the for-profit sphere.  It was 
Variable All Funded Unfunded
Number 880 363 517
Number of Board Members 11.4 12.2 10.9 **
Number of Volunteers 67.5 7.7 109.5 ***
Number of Employees 77.1 94.7 64.8 *
Total Revenue (in millions) 6.4 5.3 7.3
Total Assets (in millions) 5.3 4.0 6.2
Grant Revenue (in millions) 0.4 0.6 0.3 **
Contributions (in millions) 0.8 0.5 1.0 ***
Grant Expenditures (in millions) 0.1 0.1 0.1
Percentage of Board Members with Ties to Other Nonprofit Agencies 34.7 37.3 32.8 **
Total Number of Ties to Other Nonprofit Agencies 6.9 7.0 6.8
Total Years of Ties to Other Nonprofit Agencies 40.0 42.5 38.3 *
Percentage of Board Members with Ties to Government Agencies 14.2 14.6 13.9
Total Number of Ties to Government Agencies 2.3 2.4 2.3
Total Years of Ties to Government Agencies 14.6 16.1 13.5
Percentage of Board Members with Ties to For-Profit Agencies 29.4 27.9 30.5
Total Number of Ties to Other For-Profit Agencies 7.4 7.4 7.5
Total Years of Ties to Other For-Profit Agencies 51.3 47.3 54.2 *
Percentage of Board Members with Ties to Universities 13.2 14.0 12.6
Total Number of Ties to Universities 1.5 1.7 1.5
Total Years of Ties to Universities 9.9 9.1 10.4
Percentage of Board Members with Professional Association Memberships 22.5 21.5 23.3
Total Number of Professional Association Memberships 8.3 7.5 8.8 *
Total Years of Professional Association Memberships 20.0 23.2 17.8 **
Percentage of Board Members with Ties to Other Nonprofit Boards 19.0 17.1 20.3 **
Total Number of Appointments to Other Nonprofit Boards 6.1 5.1 6.8 **
Total Years of Appointments to Other Nonprofit Boards 17.3 16.5 17.8
Organizational Variables
Financial Variables
Relationship Variables
* significantly different from 0 at p < 0.100
** significantly different from 0 at p < 0.050
*** significantly different from 0 at p < 0.001
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possible that longer ties to other nonprofit agencies was correlated to more grant funding.  
However, board members of HRSA funded agencies were on fewer nonprofit boards.  
For professional associations, it appeared that board members of HRSA funded agencies 
were more selective in professional association memberships given that they were 
members of fewer associations.  However, membership was longer in these associations.   
Probit Model 
A probit model estimated the likelihood of funding.  The model utilized a 
dichotomous dependent variable that captured whether or not an organization received 
funding.  In the probit model, twenty-one variables (Table 5.2) were utilized to estimate 
the probability of obtaining funds received for the following fiscal year for 176 
organizations over 5 fiscal years (Appendix, Equation 1).  In the probit model, there were 
a total of 812 observations.  Observations with missing data were omitted from the probit 
model (68 observations = 7.7%).   
In general, the probit model demonstrated a strong goodness of fit.  The model 
correctly classified 93% of all cases.  The probit model correctly classified 92% of the 
agencies that received HRSA funds and 94% of the agencies that did not receive HRSA 
funds (Table 5.3). 
The probit model was a statistically significant predictor of the likelihood of 
obtaining HRSA funding for the following fiscal year (χ2 = 821.86, p < 0.001).  Variables 
that increased the probability of obtaining HRSA funding included the number of 
employees, receiving HRSA funding prior to 2008, contributions, number of ties to 
government agencies, number of years of ties to government agencies, total number of 
ties to other for-profit agencies, total years of membership in professional associations,
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Table 5.2 List of Variables for Probit Regression. 
Dependent Variable 
1 if the amount of HRSA funding received for the following fiscal year is greater than 0 and 
where y = 0 if otherwise 
Organizational Variables 
Number of board members for the previous fiscal year 
Number of volunteers for the previous fiscal year 
Number of employees in thousands for the previous fiscal year 
Financial Variables 
Receiving HRSA funding prior to 2008 (dichotomous where 1 = yes and 0 = no) 
Total revenue in millions for the previous fiscal year 
Total assets in millions for the previous fiscal year 
Grant revenue in millions for the previous fiscal year 
Amount of contributions in millions for the previous fiscal year 
Grant expenditures in millions for the previous fiscal year 
Relationship Variables 
Total number of ties to other nonprofit agencies for the previous fiscal year 
Total years of nonprofit ties for the previous fiscal year 
Total number of ties to government agencies for the previous fiscal year 
Total years of government ties for the previous fiscal year 
Total number of ties to for-profit agencies for the previous fiscal year 
Total years of for-profit ties for the previous fiscal year 
Total number of ties to universities for the previous fiscal year 
Total years of university ties for the previous fiscal year 
Total number of memberships in a professional association for the previous fiscal year 
Total years of memberships in a professional association for the previous fiscal year 
Total number of appointments to other nonprofit boards for the previous fiscal year 
Total years of appointments to other nonprofit boards for the previous fiscal year 
 
 
Table 5.3 Goodness of Fit Matrix for Probit Model. 
 
  True  
  Positive Negative Total 
Classified Positive 332 27 359 Negative 26 427 453 
 Total 358 454 812 
 
Correctly classified 93.47% 
Positive predictive value 92.48% 
Negative predictive value 94.26% 
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and total number of appointments to other nonprofit boards.  Variables that decreased the 
likelihood of HRSA funding included the number of volunteers, total revenue, the 
number of ties to other nonprofits, number of years of ties to universities, total number of 
memberships in a professional association, and total number of years of appointments at 
other nonprofit boards.  All other variables in the probit model were not statistically 
significant (Table 5.6). 
The probit model confirmed some results from the t-tests.  For instance, agencies 
that were likely to receive funds had fewer volunteers, more employees, and less 
contributions.  Agencies with board members with fewer professional association 
memberships, board members with more years of membership in a professional 
association, and board members with fewer appointments to other nonprofit boards were 
more likely to receive funds.  These findings were in line with the findings of the t-tests.  
Other differences between funding and unfunded agencies found in t-tests were not 
statistically significant in the probit model (Figure 5.1). 
The probit model did not capture the magnitude of the relationships.  The probit 
model determined the likelihood of funding; but the model did not predict the amount of 
expected funding.  In order to capture magnitude, multiple regressions were conducted in 
the following section. 
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Figure 5.1:  Illustration of Significant Variables that Increase and Decrease the 
Likelihood of HRSA Funding. 
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Multiple Regressions 
Multiple regressions were conducted to examine future HRSA funding as a 
function of the twenty-one described explanatory variables.  It is important to note that 
the explanatory variables were lagged one fiscal year behind the dependent variable in 
order to account for reverse causality between the explanatory and the dependent 
variables.  Multiple regressions without panel data were utilized in order to build future 
panel models as well as preview any existing significant relationships.  Multiple 
regressions in this situation also allowed for the examination of any potential mediating 
relationships.  Four multiple regressions were conducted that were variations of a linear 
model utilizing funding as a function of twenty-one variables (Table 5.4). 
Model 1 examined anticipated HRSA funding as a function of all lagged 21 
explanatory variables (Table 5.5; Appendix, Equation 2).  There were 880 observations 
for all 176 organizations over 5 fiscal years.  Model 2 examined indirect effects related to 
anticipated HRSA funding (Table 5.5; Appendix, Equation 3).  Model 2 examined HRSA 
funding prior to 2008 as a function of 20 explanatory variables.  As with Model 1, there 
were 880 observations for 176 organizations over 5 fiscal years.  In Model 1, HRSA 
funding prior to 2008 was used as one of the explanatory variable for anticipated HRSA 
funding.  However, due to the large correlation for prior funding, it was possible that 
some of the explanatory variables have an indirect effect on anticipated HRSA funding 
through prior HRSA funding.  Explanatory variables that were significant in Model 2 but 
not in Model 1 were considered to have an indirect effect on anticipated funding (Figure 
5.2). 
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Table 5.4  Listing of Variables for Multiple Regression Models for Non-panel Analyses. 
Dependent Variable 
Amount of HRSA funding received for the following fiscal year (Models 1 and 3) OR receiving 
HRSA funding prior to 2008 (dichotomous where 1 = yes and 0 = no) (Model 2 and 4) 
Organizational Variables 
Number of board members for the previous fiscal year 
Number of volunteers for the previous fiscal year 
Number of employees in thousands for the previous fiscal year 
Financial Variables 
Receiving HRSA funding prior to 2008 (dichotomous where 1 = yes and 0 = no) (Utilized as 
Dependent Variable for Models 2 and 4) 
Total revenue in millions for the previous fiscal year 
Total assets in millions for the previous fiscal year 
Grant revenue in millions for the previous fiscal year 
Amount of contributions in millions for the previous fiscal year 
Grant expenditures in millions for the previous fiscal year 
Relationship Variables 
Total number of ties to other nonprofit agencies for the previous fiscal year 
Total years of nonprofit ties for the previous fiscal year 
Total number of ties to government agencies for the previous fiscal year 
Total years of government ties for the previous fiscal year 
Total number of ties to for-profit agencies for the previous fiscal year 
Total years of for-profit ties for the previous fiscal year 
Total number of ties to universities for the previous fiscal year 
Total years of university ties for the previous fiscal year 
Total number of memberships in a professional association for the previous fiscal year 
Total years of memberships in a professional association for the previous fiscal year 
Total number of appointments to other nonprofit boards for the previous fiscal year 
Total years of appointments to other nonprofit boards for the previous fiscal year 
 
Table 5.5.  Multiple Regression Models for Non-panel Analyses. 
 
Model 1 
All organizations; Predicted funding as dependent variable; All lagged independent 
variables 
Model 2 
All organizations; HRSA funding prior to 2008 as dependent variable; All other 
lagged independent variables 
Model 3 
Funded organizations; Predicted funding as dependent variable; All lagged 
independent variables 
Model 4 
Funded organizations; HRSA funding prior to 2008 as dependent variable; All other 
lagged independent variables 
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Figure 5.2  Illustration of Indirect Effects on Anticipated HRSA Funding 
 
 
 
Models 3 and 4 explored relationships that were unique to agencies that received 
HRSA funding.  Model 3 examined the effects of anticipated HRSA funding as a 
function of all 21 explanatory variables (Table 5.5; Appendix, Equation 4) for agencies 
that received HRSA funding.  There were 72 organizations over 5 fiscal years for a total 
of 360 observations.  Model 4 examined HRSA funding prior to 2008 (dependent 
variable) as a function of 20 independent variables for 72 organizations over 5 fiscal 
years for a total of 360 observations (Table 5.5; Appendix, Equation 5). 
Across the four models, there were moderate significant relationships.  The 
strongest significant relationship among all models existed (r2 = .525, p < 0.001) in 
Model 1.  The strongest relationships in the model included previous HRSA funding and 
grant expenditures (B = 1.588, p < 0.001; B = 1.552, p < 0.001; respectively).  In this 
model, having HRSA funds prior to 2008 predicted that an organization is likely to 
receive $1.6 million in anticipated funding.  Likewise, granting out $1 million in funds to 
other agencies such as local governments was positively correlated with the expectation 
of receiving $1.5 million in future HRSA funds.  Of particular interest, the effect of 
relationship variables was relatively small in comparison to an organization’s financial 
variables (Table 5.6). 
 
HRSA fundingHRSA Funding Prior to 2008 in Model 1 
Significant Variables in 
Model 2 
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The changes in significant variables between Models 1 and 2 signified that there 
was an indirect relationship between some of the independent variables and predicted 
funding through prior funding.  The variables of interest were correlated to prior funding 
which was strongly correlated to future anticipated funding.  In order to examine 
mediation, a multiple regression was conducted, Model 2, utilizing the dichotomous 
variable of having HRSA funds prior to 2008 as the dependent variable instead of the 
previous dependent variable, predicted HRSA funding.  Model 2 examined 20 
explanatory variables for 176 organizations over 5 fiscal years.  The coefficients of 
Models 1 and 2 were compared to examine differences in significance, direction, and 
magnitude.  In this mediation model, of particular interest were any relationships that 
became statistically significant when changing the dependent variable (Tables 5.4 and 
5.5).  A change in significance indicated that independent variables in Model 2 were 
correlated to pre-2008 funding rather than predicted HRSA funding.  The variables with 
an indirect effect were the number of board members and university ties.  Model 2 
indicated the size of the board and the number of ties that a board member had to a 
university (B = 0.015, p < 0.001; B = 0.033, p < 0.05; respectively) were correlated to 
whether the agency received HRSA funds prior to 2008.  Funding prior to 2008 was 
affected by both the number of board members and the ties that a board member had to a 
university thus creating an indirect link to anticipated funding (Figure 5.2).  
In order to determine if funded organizations possessed different characteristics 
than unfunded organizations, multiple regressions were conducted similar to Models 1 
and 2 but limited to the 72 funded organizations over 5 fiscal years.  Model 3 was similar 
to Model 1 which examined the effect of anticipated HRSA funding as a function of all 
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21 lagged explanatory variables (Tables 5.4 and 5.5).  When considering all 21 
independent variables, there was a moderate positive correlation in Model 3 (r2 = .437, p 
< 0.001).  Fewer independent variables were statistically significant compared to Model 1 
that utilized all 176 organizations.  While the levels of many of the financial variables 
were no longer statistically significant, many of the same relationship variables remained 
statistically significant.  The largest impact was the relationship between outgoing grant 
expenditures and future HRSA funding.  For every one million dollars that a nonprofit 
granted out, future HRSA funding was correlated with an increase of $3 million (B = 
3.029, p < 0.001).  It seems that in order to bring in money, an organization must spend 
its funds (Table 5.6).  
Finally, Model 4 showed evidence that receiving HRSA funding prior to 2008 
served as a mediator for several of the variables.  As with Model 2, a regression was 
conducted utilizing funding prior to 2008 as the dependent variable instead of predicted 
HRSA funding.  Model 4 utilized 20 explanatory lagged variables for 72 organizations 
over 5 fiscal years totaling 360 observations (Table 5.4 and 5.5).  Independent variables 
that were statistically significant in Model 4 but not significant in Model 3 were 
considered to have an indirect effect on anticipated funding through prior funding to 
2008.  There were six variables that show signs of mediation through HRSA funding 
prior to 2008:  the number of volunteers, total assets, number of ties to other nonprofit 
agencies, number of ties to for-profit agencies, years of ties to universities, and number of 
appointments to other nonprofit boards.  While the effects of these variables 
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Table 5.6.  Coefficients of Probit and Multiple Regression Models (Non-panel). 
 
Model
Organization Sample
Dependent Variable
Adjusted R2 0.525 *** 0.243 *** 0.437 *** 0.310 ***
Number of Board Members 0.028 0.001 0.015 *** -0.003 0.001
Number of Volunteers -0.007 ** -0.001 * -0.001 *** -0.002 -0.005 ***
Number of Employees 0.012 *** 0.004 *** 0.002 *** 0.005 ** 0.001
HRSA funding prior to 2008 3.374 *** 1.588 *** 0.484 *
Total Revenue -0.195 *** -0.012 ** -0.015 *** -0.021 -0.005
Total Assets -0.071 -0.027 *** -0.006 ** 0.016 0.042 ***
Grant Revenue -0.027 0.098 *** -0.010 -0.031 -0.012
Contributions 0.161 ** 0.079 *** -0.010 0.417 *** -0.010
Grant Expenditures 0.523 1.552 *** 0.119 3.029 *** 0.004
Total Number of Ties to Other Nonprofit Agencies -0.097 ** -0.010 0.007 0.005 0.015 **
Total Years of Ties to Other Nonprofit Agencies 0.010 0.005 ** -0.001 0.012 ** -0.001
Total Number of Ties to Government Agencies 0.074 ** -0.042 ** 0.023 ** -0.087 ** -0.004
Total Years of Ties to Government Agencies 0.010 ** 0.007 ** -0.003 ** 0.011 ** -0.003 **
Total Number of Ties to Other For-Profit Agencies 0.110 *** 0.024 ** 0.001 -0.003 -0.008 **
Total Years of Ties to Other For-Profit Agencies -0.007 -0.003 ** -0.001 ** -0.002 0.001
Total Number of Ties to Universities 0.071 -0.033 0.033 ** -0.143 ** 0.004
Total Years of Ties to Universities -0.026 * -0.002 -0.003 * 0.011 0.004 **
Total Number of Professional Association Memberships -0.067 ** 0.015 ** -0.011 *** 0.045 ** -0.006
Total Years of Professional Association Memberships 0.015 ** -0.007 *** 0.005 *** -0.013 *** 0.002 **
Total Number of Appointments to Other Nonprofit Boards 0.060 ** 0.004 -0.005 0.021 -0.010 **
Total Years of Appointments to Other Nonprofit Boards -0.017 ** -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 0.001
Relationship Variables
* p < 0.100
** p < 0.050
*** p < 0.001
Independent Variable
Organizational Variables
Financial Variables
Dependent Variable Dependent Variable
Funded 
Organizations
Receiving Funding 
(Dichotomous) Predicted Funding 
Funding Prior to 
2008 Predicted Funding
Funding Prior to 
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Figure 5.3.  Relationships of Significant Variables for Non-panel Multiple Regressions for All Organizations (Models 1 and 2). 
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on funding prior to 2008 were small, these variables indirectly impact grant acquisition 
for agencies that received funds.  These variables only mattered when an agency had a 
history of funding prior to 2008.  The number of volunteers, ties to for-profit agencies, 
and number of board appointments to other nonprofits were negatively correlated to 
funding prior to 2008.  The other listed significant variables were positively correlated to 
funding prior to 2008 (Table 5.6; Figure 5.4). 
The following interpretations apply to not only the model-building non-panel 
regressions but also to the upcoming panel data analyses.  In summation, when 
considering all organizations, the following variables had a positive effect on the next 
year’s HRSA funding:  the number of employees, having HRSA funds prior to 2008, 
contributions, the total number as well as length of years of ties to government agencies, 
the number of ties to for-profit agencies, the length of ties in professional association 
memberships, and the number of appointments to other nonprofit boards.  In alignment 
with the t-tests, more employees were positively correlated to having a greater need for 
external funding.  The positive relationship between HRSA funds and contributions 
however contradicted the t-tests.  The number of volunteers, total revenue, the total 
number of ties to a nonprofit agency, the years of ties to universities, the number of 
professional association memberships, and the years of appointment to other nonprofit 
boards were negatively correlated to the amount of future HRSA funding. 
 Across analyses, there were several notable findings to point out.  A consistent 
finding across analyses was that the number of employees had a positive correlation to 
predicted funding.  The number of employees was a strong predictor of increases in 
HRSA funding.  It makes sense that larger agencies had larger budgets due to more 
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personnel costs such as salaries, benefits, and facilities.  With larger budgets come the 
potential for a greater need to cover costs through grant income.  It was possible that a 
larger pool of employees was an indicator of a greater scope of operations in an agency.  
The nature of the mission may require more staff resulting in a greater need for financial 
resources.  There could have been a tendency for larger organizations to branch out into a 
wide variety of operations.  Smaller organizations were more likely to devote time and 
personnel to fewer operations. 
Multi-operational organizations were likely to require more financial resources.  
In the case of a nonprofit community healthcare facility, it would cost more to operate a 
facility with twenty doctors as opposed to a smaller facility with two doctors even if both 
facilities intake the same number of patients.  Thus, larger numbers of staff necessitated 
greater operational costs leading to an increased probability of financial need.  This 
finding held true in analyses that examined all organizations and analyses that examined 
only funded agencies.  The varying nature of tasks or mission was potentially an omitted 
variable to consider.  While analyses show that the number of employees was correlated 
to HRSA funding, capturing the nature of organizational mission may help to explain 
causality between the two variables. 
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Figure 5.4.  Relationships of Significant Variables for Non-panel Multiple Regressions for Funded Organizations (Models 3 and 4). 
 
HRSA funding 
Number of professional association 
 Memberships 
(+) 
Number of university ties 
(-) 
Contributions 
(+) 
Funding prior to 2008 
(+) 
 
Number of employees 
(+) 
Number of board appointments 
(-) 
Grant expenditures 
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Length of nonprofit ties 
(+) 
Length of government ties 
(+) 
Total assets 
(+) 
Number of volunteers 
(-) 
Length of professional 
association memberships 
(-) 
Number of nonprofit ties 
(+) 
Number of university ties 
(+) 
Number of for-profit ties 
(-) 
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Another finding that was consistent across analyses was that the number of 
volunteers was negatively correlated to anticipated funding.  This finding held true only 
for samples that considered all 176 organizations.  A likely explanation for such findings 
was that organizations that utilized more volunteers lacked the need to hire more 
employees.  Volunteers took on the job duties otherwise conducted by an employee.  
Volunteers cost an organization considerably less than a paid employee.  Volunteers are 
not entirely cost-free as organizations must provide working areas, training, and other 
tangible and intangible resources.  However, volunteers do not require salary and 
benefits.  By relying upon volunteers, organizations were less likely to require higher 
amounts of operational revenue normally used for the salary and benefits of employees.  
More volunteers resulted in less personnel costs for the organization ultimately leading to 
fewer grant applications. 
A third point to note was that contributions and grant expenditures had a 
consistently positive and direct effect on anticipated HRSA funds across analyses.  These 
two variables were only statistically significant when considering their relationships to 
predicted funding.  With other employees and volunteers, there was a slight moderating 
effect in that the presence of HRSA funding prior to 2008 marginally increased the effect 
on anticipated funding.  With contributions and grant expenditures, the relationship was 
direct.  
Higher levels of contributions were correlated with increases in future HRSA 
funding.  This could result from the fact that contributions were donations.  A greater 
reliance on donations may result in stronger relationships with potential funders in a 
nonprofit network.  Organizations with many donations are well-known and legitimate 
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which increases the organization’s reputation among grantors.  However, a greater 
reliance on contributions may also be a sign of the financial state in which an 
organization finds itself.  For instance, an organization that relies upon contributions may 
not have access to other sources of revenue.  As a result, the organization finds itself in a 
situation of having to secure a variety of revenue sources including grant solicitations.  
While this is by no means a definitive explanation, it explains the presence of a positive 
relationship between contributions and anticipated HRSA funding. 
A strong predictor of funding across analyses was grant expenditures.  
Organizations that grant out their money to other organizations were expected to receive 
more HRSA funding.  While it was possible that granting out money increased an 
organization’s reputation, there may be an alternate explanation.  It was possible that 
organizations that granted out funds to local governments and other nonprofits did so as a 
way to enhance current operations.  Granting out was one way in which a nonprofit 
outsourced its functions.  The more that an organization outsourced certain functions, the 
more likely it was that the organization could expand its cadre of services into other 
fields.  Expanding operations led to more funding acquisition as there was a greater need 
for money. 
An important issue to address in these and in upcoming analyses occurred with 
the relationship ties variables.  In almost all of the analyses, the number of ties and the 
years of ties had opposite relationships in which one was positive and the other was 
negative.  In some cases, the number of ties had a positive relationship with funding 
whereas the years of ties had a negative relationship.  For example, the number of board 
appointments to other nonprofit agencies was positively correlated to anticipated funding 
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whereas the years at other board appointments was negatively correlated (Table 5.6).  As 
an interpretation, more funding was expected when a board member had many ties to 
other agencies that were not long in duration.  In essence, board members were 
encouraged to establish many ties that were shorter in duration.  Theorists (Granovetter, 
1973) would call this the strength of a weak tie.  Under this theory, board members 
garnered more from a wide net of loosely connected individuals.  The advantage was that 
knowledge spread to a variety of individuals across a number of disciplines rather than 
within a close circle of individuals.  Weak ties allowed for the dissemination of 
information over long distances without much redundancy (Granovetter, 1973).  In the 
case of this study, it would seem advantageous to have relationships with a large variety 
of professionals as opposed to a select close knit group of likeminded individuals.  It was 
possible that in order to attract funding, board members networked across weak, loose 
ties as information about their organization spread across a number of disciplines. 
In other cases, the number of ties was negatively correlated whereas the years of 
ties was positively correlated.  For example, there was a negative correlation to the 
number of memberships that a board member had to professional associations whereas 
there was a positive correlation to the years that the member had in professional 
associations (Table 5.6).  More funding was correlated to fewer memberships in 
professional associations but also longer professional association memberships.  An 
interpretation of this finding was that in order to obtain more HRSA funds, board 
members limited their memberships in professional associations to a select few and 
remained in those memberships for a longer period of time.  This contradicts the theory 
that there is strength in weak ties (Granovetter, 1973).  Rather than casting one’s net 
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across a broad spectrum of individuals, the board members positioned the organization at 
a funding advantage by maintaining stronger ties.  To keep such strong ties, board 
members became more selective and maintained the relationships they build in 
professional association meetings.   
This interpretation might reflect the personal characteristics, or the human capital, 
of individuals rather than the overall social capital of the individual.  Social capital is 
reflected by the number of connections within the industry of health care.  One way to 
make the distinction between human and social capital is to capture the similarity of the 
professional associations of board members.  For instance, Board Member A with several 
memberships in health care professional associations is considered to have more 
connections among other health care professionals.  Board Member A has a greater social 
capital as he/she can draw upon his/her connections within the health care community.  
Board Member B with the same number of associations in a variety of multi-disciplined 
associations has a broader network to other fields.  Board Member B can draw upon a 
wide network of different types of professionals, but Board Member A can draw upon a 
concentrated network of health care professionals.  Board Member B provides support for 
the strength of weak ties (Granovetter, 1973) while Board Member A provides support 
for the benefit of stronger social capital. 
A third possibility for the phenomenon of opposing correlation coefficients could 
be that separating the number of ties and the years of each tie for each relationship 
created a ratio of the total relationship.  In this possibility, the measurement of 
relationships via board appointments was simply one variable.  By splitting board 
appointment ties into length and breadth, the variables did not necessarily measure 
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different facets.  Rather, splitting the tie created a fraction, or a rational relationship, of a 
whole.  By splitting the variables into two components, in order to mathematically remain 
negative, one variable must be positive while the other is negative.  One way to support a 
ratio is to examine the consistency of the correlation coefficient.  If the direction of the 
coefficients constantly changes between positive and negative, it is possible that the 
variables are ratios of one overarching variable.  If one variable is consistently positive 
while the other is consistently negative, there is some support that the relationship 
direction is a true effect.  In general, there did not seem to be large degrees of consistency 
of relationship direction across the analyses thus giving some support to the idea that 
measuring two parts created a rational relationship of one overarching variable. 
Another way to examine the possibility that there was a ratio effect on 
relationship variables is to consider utilizing one variable to capture the relationship tie as 
opposed to splitting the variable into length and breadth.  As seen in the t-tests (Table 
5.1), a variable was created that calculated the percentage of board members with a tie 
rather than total number of ties or the total years of ties.  For example, with the case of 
ties to other nonprofit agencies, the single variable measured the percentage of board 
members with ties to other nonprofit agencies rather than examining total number of ties 
to other nonprofit agencies and the total years of ties to other nonprofit agencies.  The 
idea that splitting variables caused a ratio was difficult to support when running 
regressions for Models 1-4 utilizing percentages of board members with each category of 
tie rather than number and years.  In many instances, when percentages were used, there 
were no significant correlations between the relationship category and the amount of 
anticipated funding.  Additionally, where the number and years were used, one of the 
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variables in the relationship was statistically significant while the other was not 
significant.  While these findings did not necessarily invalidate the argument that the 
number and years of ties were ratio components of an overarching relationship variable, 
the data presented in this study did not provide consistent support.  This finding must be 
considered then in the upcoming panel data regression series. 
However, before making definite conclusions at this point, there are reservations 
that must be made about non-panel analyses.  Though the multiple regressions showed 
that variables had a variety of effects on funding, it is important to note limitations in 
these analyses.  Utilizing multiple regressions treated each observation as an independent 
case.  These analyses did not take into account that there were changes over time in these 
organizations.  These analyses also did not fully take into account that variance may be 
explained by factors within the organization.  It is for these precautions that panel data 
regressions were conducted.  The former multiple regressions were only intended for the 
purposes of model building in an effort to rule out the null hypothesis that there were no 
significant differences with the models.  Non-panel multiple regressions were meant to 
justify the continuance of running panel data analyses.  The non-panel multiple 
regressions also were meant to provide evidence of the possibility of mediation and 
moderation for panel data series.  It is for these limitations that panel data regressions 
should take precedence over the former multiple regressions. 
Panel Data 
The panel data analyses examined both fixed effects and between effects panel 
regressions to capture any longitudinal and cross-section factors that affected funding 
over a period of five fiscal years (2008-2012).  In all panel data regressions, the 
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explanatory variables were lagged in order to be considered a function of the following 
fiscal year of HRSA funding.  The one-year lag of the explanatory variables was done in 
order to predict funding as well as minimize reverse causality.  Fixed effects regressions 
accounted for changes in the organizational explanatory variables within agencies that 
affected changes in funding across the five fiscal years examined.  In other words, fixed 
effects models examined the marginal changes in the dependent variable as a function of 
marginal changes with respect to each of the independent variables.  The between effects 
panel regressions examined differences in average levels of the dependent variable, 
HRSA funding, as a function of average levels of the independent variables among all of 
the organizations.1  Eight linear models were conducted as with the standard regressions 
utilizing twenty-one variables (Table 5.7).  For each model, fixed effects (A) and between 
effects (B) regressions captured both within and between organizational differences.  In 
total, there were 8 panel data regression sub models (Table 5.8). 
Table 5.7. List of Variables for Panel Analyses. 
Dependent Variable 
Amount of HRSA funding received for the following fiscal year (Models 1 and 3) OR receiving 
HRSA funding prior to 2008 (dichotomous where 1 = yes and 0 = no) (Model 2 and 4) 
Organizational Variables 
Number of board members for the previous fiscal year 
Number of volunteers for the previous fiscal year 
Number of employees in thousands for the previous fiscal year 
Financial Variables 
Receiving HRSA funding prior to 2008 (dichotomous where 1 = yes and 0 = no) (Utilized as 
Dependent Variable for Models 2 and 4) 
Total revenue in millions for the previous fiscal year 
Total assets in millions for the previous fiscal year 
Grant revenue in millions for the previous fiscal year 
Amount of contributions in millions for the previous fiscal year 
Grant expenditures in millions for the previous fiscal year 
  
                                                 
1 Special gratitude to Dr. J.S. Butler and Dr. Dwight Denison for the explanation of fixed and between 
effects regressions. 
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Table 5.7 (continued) 
 
Relationship Variables 
Total number of ties to other nonprofit agencies for the previous fiscal year 
Total years of nonprofit ties for the previous fiscal year 
Total number of ties to government agencies for the previous fiscal year 
Total years of government ties for the previous fiscal year 
Total number of ties to for-profit agencies for the previous fiscal year 
Total years of for-profit ties for the previous fiscal year 
Total number of ties to universities for the previous fiscal year 
Total years of university ties for the previous fiscal year 
Total number of memberships in a professional association for the previous fiscal year 
Total years of memberships in a professional association for the previous fiscal year 
Total number of appointments to other nonprofit boards for the previous fiscal year 
Total years of appointments to other nonprofit boards for the previous fiscal year 
 
Table 5.8. Fixed-effects and Between-effects Regression Models for Panel Analyses. 
 
Model 1 
All organizations; Predicted funding as dependent variable; All independent lagged 
variables 
1 A Fixed Effects 
1 B Between Effects 
Model 2 
All organizations; HRSA funding prior to 2008 as dependent variable; All other 
independent lagged variables 
2 A Fixed Effects 
2 B Between Effects 
Model 3 
Funded organizations; Predicted funding as dependent variable; All independent 
lagged variables 
3 A Fixed Effects 
3 B Between Effects 
Model 4 
Funded organizations; HRSA funding prior to 2008 as dependent variable; All other 
independent lagged variables 
4 A Fixed Effects 
4 B Between Effects 
 
Models 1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B examined all 176 organizations over 5 fiscal years for 
a total of 812 observations.  In some cases, organizations did not have five years of 
reportable data and were dropped from the panel analysis.  As with the previous models, 
the above multiple regression served as Model 1 that considered the changes of the 
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dependent variable as a function of the changes of all 21 lagged explanatory variables 
(Table 5.7).  Model 1A was a fixed effects model while Model 1B was a between effects 
model (Table 5.8; Appendix, Equation 6).  Model 2 utilized the dichotomous variable, 
HRSA funding prior to 2008, as a function of 20 lagged explanatory variables.  Model 2 
explored prior funding as a mediator between predicted funding and other independent 
variables (Table 5.8; Appendix, Equation 7).  Model 2A was a fixed effects model while 
Model 2B was a between effects model.  Finally, in order to determine if funded 
organizations possessed different characteristics, panel data regressions were conducted 
limited to 72 funded organizations over 5 fiscal years for a total of 358 observations.  
Model 3 examined predicted funding as a function of all 21 lagged explanatory variables 
for 72 organizations over 5 fiscal years (Table 5.8; Appendix, Equation 8).  Model 3A 
was a fixed effects model while Model 3B was a between effects model.  Model 4 
examined HRSA funding prior to 2008 as the dependent variable as a function of 20 
independent lagged variables for 72 organizations over 5 fiscal years for a total of 358 
observations.  Model 4A was a fixed effects model while Model 4B was a between 
effects model (Table 5.8; Appendix, Equation 9).  
In Model 1A (fixed effects), there was a weak effect within organizations across 
time (r2 = .067, p < 0.05).  There were three variables that were statistically significant:  
incoming grant revenue, the number of ties to a university, and the years that a board 
member was in a professional association.  When comparing changes within an 
organization across the five fiscal years, a $1 million increase in revenue from grants was 
correlated to increases of $79,000 in HRSA funds (B = 0.079, p < 0.05).  Along the same 
logic, each year of professional association membership was correlated to a decrease of 
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$19,000 (B = -0.019, p < 0.10).  The strongest relationships within an organization across 
time was with the number of ties that a board member had with a university.  The 
expected change in an organization for every tie that a board member had to a university 
was correlated with a decrease of $145,000 (B = -0.145, p < 0.10).  Overall, in Model 1A, 
changes in the two relationship ties that were statistically significant had an inverse 
relationship to changes in predicted HRSA funding.  When an organization experienced 
increases in either one of these relationship ties, HRSA funding was expected to 
decrease.  Changes in the financial variable, grant revenue, were positively correlated to 
changes in HRSA funding (Table 5.9). 
Model 1B (between effects) considered the average levels of predicted funding as 
a function of the average levels of independent variables.  Model 1B examined 21 
explanatory lagged variables for 176 organizations across five fiscal years.  The between 
effects model demonstrated a strong statistically significant effect when focusing on 
cross-sections of organizations (r2 = 0.660, p < 0.001).  Five variables were positively 
correlated while three variables were negatively correlated to predicted funding.  The 
strongest relationships occurred with financial and organizational variables.  For instance, 
it was expected that levels of HRSA funding were positively correlated to the number of 
employees (B = 0.006, p < 0.001).  Prior funding, which is a dichotomous variable, was a 
strong predictor of future HRSA funds (B = 1.491, p < 0.001).  Levels of HRSA funding 
were also positively correlated to grant expenditures (B = 2.224, p < 0.001).  When 
comparing between organizations, granting out $1 million to local agencies was 
correlated to increases of $2.2 million in HRSA funding.  Total revenue and total assets 
both had small inverse relationships to expected funding such that increases in either 
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variable were correlated to decreases of approximately $33,000 in HRSA funding (B = -
0.034, p < 0.05; B = -0.032, p < 0.05; respectively).  The smallest effects occurred with 
relationship ties variables.  The length of ties that a board member had to government 
agencies was positively related (B = 0.007, p < 0.10) while the length of membership in a 
professional association was negatively related (B = -0.007, p < 0.10) (Table 5.9). 
Model 2A was a fixed effects model and utilized prior HRSA funding to 2008 as 
a function of 20 explanatory lagged variables for 176 organizations over five fiscal years.  
No statistical significance existed in the model testing for indirect relationship to 
anticipated HRSA funding through prior funding.  Therefore, when considering fixed 
effects panel data, it appears that there were three variables of significance that had a 
direct effect on predicted funding:  grant revenue (+), number of university ties (-), and 
length of membership in professional associations (-).  There was no evidence of 
mediation (Table 5.9, Figure 5.5). 
Model 2B was a between effects model and examined HRSA funding prior to 
2008 as a function of 20 explanatory lagged variables for 176 organizations for five fiscal 
years.  In Model 2B, there were two variables that were indirectly related to anticipated 
HRSA funding through prior HRSA funding.  Model 2B showed that the dependent 
variable, HRSA funding prior to 2008, was a function of the number of board members 
and the number of volunteers.  These two variables were correlated to prior HRSA 
funding and had an indirect effect on anticipated HRSA funding.  The number of board 
members was positively correlated to previous HRSA funding (B = 0.016, p < 0.10) 
while the number of volunteers was negatively correlated (B = -0.001, p < 0.05). 
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Table 5.9.  Coefficients of Fixed-effects and Between-effects Regressions (Panel). 
 
MODEL
Organization Sample
Dependent Variable
R2 (Fixed effects:  within; Between effects:  between) 0.066 ** 0.660 *** 0.035 0.335 *** 0.157 *** 0.797 *** 0.145 ** 0.503 **
Number of Board Members -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.016 * -0.018 -0.020 -0.001 0.005
Number of Volunteers 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 ** 0.005 -0.011 ** 0.001 -0.006 ***
Number of Employees -0.001 0.006 *** 0.001 0.004 *** 0.001 0.012 *** 0.001 0.001
HRSA funding prior to 2008 0.276 1.491 *** 0.472 -0.084
Total Revenue 0.002 -0.034 ** 0.001 -0.031 *** 0.122 * -0.144 ** 0.016 ** -0.015
Total Assets 0.001 -0.032 ** -0.001 -0.005 -0.206 ** 0.121 * -0.006 0.056 **
Grant Revenue 0.079 ** 0.035 0.003 -0.025 0.019 -0.290 ** -0.013 * -0.033
Contributions 0.009 0.101 ** 0.002 -0.002 -0.102 0.637 *** 0.002 -0.016
Grant Expenditures -0.029 2.224 *** 0.004 0.133 -0.510 5.336 *** -0.064 0.263
Total Number of Ties to Other Nonprofit Agencies -0.017 -0.007 0.017 *** 0.006 -0.008 0.015 0.042 *** 0.019
Total Years of Ties to Other Nonprofit Agencies -0.012 0.005 -0.001 -0.001 -0.024 0.010 * -0.002 -0.002
Total Number of Ties to Government Agencies -0.066 -0.036 -0.008 0.022 -0.139 -0.109 ** -0.024 -0.010
Total Years of Ties to Government Agencies -0.003 0.007 * 0.001 -0.003 0.014 0.017 ** -0.002 -0.002
Total Number of Ties to Other For-Profit Agencies -0.012 0.023 0.006 0.001 0.010 -0.003 0.003 -0.006
Total Years of Ties to Other For-Profit Agencies -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.017 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001
Total Number of Ties to Universities -0.145 * -0.042 0.002 0.031 -0.128 -0.250 ** 0.001 0.007
Total Years of Ties to Universities 0.014 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.017 0.032 ** -0.006 0.005
Total Number of Professional Association Memberships 0.044 0.011 -0.012 ** -0.012 -0.048 0.043 * -0.034 ** -0.005
Total Years of Professional Association Memberships -0.019 * -0.007 * 0.001 0.005 ** -0.017 -0.012 ** 0.001 0.002
Total Number of Appointments to Other Nonprofit Boards 0.050 0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.120 0.013 0.011 -0.013
Total Years of Appointments to Other Nonprofit Boards -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 0.002
* p < 0.100
** p < 0.050
*** p < 0.001
Dependent Variable Dependent Variable
Funded 
Organizations
Funded 
Organizations
Funded 
Organizations
Predicted Funding Predicted Funding
Funding Prior to 
2008
Funding Prior to 
2008
Relationship Variables
3A 3B 4A 4B
Fixed Effects Between Effects Fixed Effects Between Effects
Funded 
Organizations
Independent Variable
Organizational Variables
Financial Variables
Dependent Variable Dependent Variable
Predicted 
Funding Predicted Funding
Funding Prior to 
2008
Funding Prior to 
2008
All Organizations All Organizations All Organziations All Organizations
Fixed Effects Between Effects Fixed Effects Between Effects
1A 1B 2A 2B
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Though grant expenditures appeared to have a strong direct relationship between 
organizations, no mediation occurred with this variable.  However, in the case of grant 
expenditures, the positive relationship changed by becoming weaker in the presence of 
HRSA funding prior to 2008 (B change from 6.498 to 3.952).  Grant expenditures had an 
effect on predicted funding while also being affected by the presence of pre 2008 HRSA 
funding (Table 5.9, Figure 5.6) 
 
Figure 5.5.  Relationships of Significant Variables for Fixed-effect Panel Regression for 
All Organizations (Models 1A and 2A). 
 
 
In summation, there seemed to be few changes in variables that were statistically 
significant when considering a fixed effects model within the agencies across time.  
Changes in the financial variable, grant revenue, had a positive impact when examining 
variance within organizations across time.  Changes in relationship ties related to the 
number of university ties and the length of professional association membership had 
HRSA funding 
Grant revenue 
(+) 
Length of professional 
association memberships 
(-) 
Number of university 
ties 
(-) 
 87 
 
small negative effects on changes in predicted funding.  There was also no evidence of 
any mediation occurring in the fixed effects models.  However, when examining the 
between effects model, there was evidence of an indirect relationship between the 
number of board members and the number of volunteers with anticipated HRSA funds 
through the historical variable, HRSA funding prior to 2008 (Table 5.9). 
As for grant revenue, when an organization increased its grant funding over fiscal 
years, it was possible that as an organization continued to receive funding, it acquired 
more grants.  When an organization applied for a grant, it may have been necessary for 
the agency to add on services which then warranted the need to apply for additional 
funds.  If this were the case, it would seem likely that other revenue sources would 
increase as well.  For instance, a greater need for funding could be reflected in positive 
relationships in contributions and total revenue.  Though changes in both variables were 
positive, they were not statistically significant, and therefore no sound conclusions can be 
made.  In some cases, the addition of grant revenue to an agency’s funding pool signified 
the acquisition of a recurring multi-year grant.  However, since inflation was accounted 
for in the model, any increases from multi-year grants reflected significant increases in 
grant funds. 
Of particular interest was the rather large negative effect that changes in the 
number of university ties had to changes in predicted funding.  As the number of ties to a 
university increased, HRSA funding was expected to decrease.  It was possible that when 
a board member had a significant amount of ties to a university, those connections 
facilitated funding from universities rather than from government agencies.  Instead of  
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Figure 5.6.  Relationships of Significant Variables for Between-effect Panel Regressions for All Organizations (Models 1B and 2B). 
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Grant expenditures 
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Length of government ties 
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Number of board members 
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 89 
 
relying on government grants, the agency relied upon grants from a university.  The 
funding from university grants offset funding from the government.  When resources 
were provided from an institution such as a university, the financial need of the 
organization was fulfilled and the necessity of acquiring HRSA funding was eliminated.  
If this logic is true, this provides some support for the idea that network connections had 
an effect on potential funding.  The funding in question was acquired from sources other 
than the government. 
However, it was also possible that university ties were an indication that an 
agency was affiliated with a university health care network.  A health care agency may be 
a part of a state university’s health care network and receives revenue as a result.  The 
revenue was not grant related but part of a university’s annual budget.  For instance, a 
staff member at the University of Kentucky served on the board of a community health 
care facility that was a smaller affiliate or satellite office of the University of Kentucky 
Health Care system.  The revenue of the smaller affiliate was part of the larger University 
of Kentucky Health Care system.  HRSA funding in this situation was awarded to 
umbrella health care systems and filtered down rather than going directly to smaller 
community health care affiliates.  When university ties were considered as a dependent 
variable (as with prior 2008 HRSA funding), no statistically significant effects occurred 
for agencies that received funds or agencies that did not receive funds.  From this finding, 
there was no evidence of mediation through university ties. 
For the between effects models, the largest effects of prediction occurred with 
financial variables.  One of the strongest relationships existed with grant expenditures 
(the number of employee was scaled differently).  As with the non-panel regressions, 
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grant expenditures were a strong predictor of funding between organizations.  The same 
logic from the non-panel regressions continued to apply for the panel regression analyses.  
Over time, organizations granted out their money and were expected to receive more 
HRSA funding.  It may hold that spending money resulted in making money.  Again, it 
was possible that granting out was one way in which a nonprofit outsourced its functions.  
When an agency expanded its range of services, this led to a greater need for money 
ultimately leading to applying for more grants.  
Higher levels of contributions also were correlated with higher levels of HRSA 
funding.  Acquiring donations led to government funding.  This may lend some support 
to the idea that legitimacy and reputation acquired through donor networks increased the 
chances of acquiring government funding.  An agency that is legitimate and reputable to 
one group of individuals (private donors) is also legitimate and reputable to another 
group of donors (government granting officials).  Some research found that when an 
agency received a grant, it also received increases in donations (Diamond, 1999; Brooks, 
2000; Huetel, 2014).  This phenomenon is referred to as “crowding-in” and follows the 
assumption that a grant from the federal government is a signal to donors that an agency 
is reputable (Huetel, 2014).  If the government trusts an agency to utilize taxpayer dollars 
for services, then private donors assume that the agency is a legitimate and trustworthy 
provider.  Crowding-in is especially significant for new and/or small organizations as 
these organizations do not have established reputations among donors (Brooks, 2000; 
Huetel, 2014).  The finding that contributions were positively correlated to future funds 
lends some support to this theory (Figure 5.6). 
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When comparing the fixed effects regression with the between effects regression, 
several relationships changed resulting in differences in interpretation between the two 
regressions.  In Model 1 examining fixed and between effects panel regressions for all 
organizations, five variables changed from no statistical significance in the fixed effects 
regression to statistical significance in the between effects regression.  For this model, 
these variables did not change within organizations from year to year.  The number of 
employees, grant expenditures, and the years of government ties showed a positive 
relationship in the between effects models.  As the levels of all three of these variables 
increased, the levels of HRSA funding was expected to increase.  Organizations with 
larger numbers of employees were correlated to higher amounts of HRSA funding.  
Likewise, higher levels of expenditures were correlated to higher levels of HRSA funding 
while longer ties to government were correlated to higher levels of funding.  However, no 
relationships existed with increases of any of the three variables and funding if changes in 
these variables occurred within an organization over the five fiscal years.  In other words, 
if an organization had a small number of employees, simply increasing the number of 
employees in following fiscal years did not have an impact for that organization in regard 
to HRSA funding.  In line with this result, negative relationships emerged in the between 
effects regression that were not significant in the fixed effects.  Total revenue and total 
assets were not significant in the fixed effects regressions yet these variables were 
inversely related to HRSA funding in the between effects model.  Organizations with 
higher levels of revenue or assets were correlated with lower levels of HRSA funding.  
However, when an organization increased revenue or assets over five fiscal years, HRSA 
funding did not necessarily change. 
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As with previous analyses, Models 3 and 4 were conducted similar to Models 1 
and 2 but limited to 72 funded organizations over five fiscal years in order to determine if 
funded organizations possessed different characteristics.  Model 3A was a fixed effect 
model utilizing all 21 individual variables (Table 5.8) for 72 funded organizations over 
five fiscal years totaling 358 observations.  The analyses were limited only to those 72 
organizations that had received HRSA funding (Tables 5.7 and 5.8).   
In Model 3A, there was a significant positive effect (r2 = .157, p < 0.001).  There 
were two independent variables of significance.  Total assets had an inverse relationship 
to predicted funding (B = -0.206, p < 0.05) while total revenue had a positive relationship 
(B = 0.122, p < 0.10).  Within an organization across time, an increase of $1 million in 
total revenue was correlated to increases in HRSA funding of $122,000 the following 
fiscal year.  An increase of $1 million in total assets was correlated to decreases of 
funding by $206,000.  All other variables, particularly relationship ties, showed no 
statistically significant effect on expected HRSA funding.  Rather, the financial portfolio 
of an organization was expected to determine the amount of HRSA funding for the 
following fiscal year (Table 5.9). 
When examining effects of the average level of variables between organizations 
as in Model 3B, there was a much stronger relationship (r2 = 0.797, p < 0.001).  Fourteen 
of the variables that were expected to predict future funding were statistically significant.  
The variables that had a positive relationship to predicted funding included:  the number 
of employees, total assets, contributions, grant expenditures, the length of board member 
ties to other nonprofits, the length of board member ties to government agencies, the 
length of university ties, and the number of professional association memberships.  Those 
 93 
 
variables with a negative relationship included:  the number of volunteers, total revenue, 
grant revenue, the number of ties a board member has to a government agency, the 
number of university ties, and the length of membership in professional associations.  As 
with other analyses, the largest effects occurred in the organizational and financial 
variables.  The number of employees predicted higher levels of HRSA funding (B = 
0.012, p < 0.001).  A $1 million increase in grant expenditures was expected to increase 
HRSA funding by $5 million while a $1 million increase in contributions was correlated 
to increases in funding by $600,000 (B = 5.336, p < 0.001; B = 0.637, p < 0.001; 
respectively) (Table 5.9). 
Of note was the negative relationship between predicted HRSA funding and the 
number of ties to a university.  More university ties were expected to decrease predicted 
funding by $250,000 while more government ties were expected to decrease predicted 
funding by $109,000 (B = -0.250, p < 0.05; B = -0.109, p < 0.05; respectively).  While 
these effects were not as strong as financial or organizational variables, the negative 
effects in the relationship variables of Model 3B were strong in comparison to the effects 
of relationship variables in other analyses (Table 5.9). 
Finally, Models 4A and 4B examined whether any mediating variables occurred 
when examining within and between organizational relationships.  In the fixed effects 
panel regression used in model 3A, the dichotomous variable, prior funding, did not show 
statistical significance.  The lack of change indicated that mediation did not occur.  When 
running Model 4A that only considered funded organizations, though there were three 
variables of statistical significance, the low coefficients of the three variables led to the 
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conclusion that, though there was an indirect effect on predicted HRSA funding through 
prior funding, no reasonable change existed (Table 5.9). 
The same issue was more pronounced in Model 4B, the between effects model 
that utilized the dichotomous dependent variable as a function of 20 explanatory 
variables.  Prior HRSA funding was not a statistically significant variable in the primary 
model (Model 3B).  Additionally, all variables of significance in the between effects 
mediation model were also statistically significant in the main model.  Therefore, there 
was no evidence of mediation with HRSA funding prior to 2008 in both the fixed effects 
and the between effects models (Table 5.9). 
A noteworthy observation to make is that the change in the number of employees 
did not have an effect in the fixed effects models but the number of employees always 
had a strong positive relationship in the between effects models.  Larger organizations 
received more funding, however, increasing the number of employees did not increase 
funding levels.  For one organization, from a longitudinal perspective, changing the 
number of employees will not impact expected funding.  However, from a cross sectional 
or between organizations perspective, the number of employees had a significantly 
positive relationship with expected funding.  When comparing the average variance 
across all organizations, the amount of employees did matter.  Larger organizations were 
expected to receive more funding which is not necessarily a surprising finding.  In a 
future iteration, one issue to examine are the ratios of funding to revenue rather than 
absolute amounts. 
As with differences in fixed effects and between effects regressions previously 
mentioned, there were several variables that became statistically significant when 
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examining changes between the two regressions for organizations that were funded.  
Seven variables that were not significant in the fixed effects regression became 
statistically significant in the between effects regression.  The number of employees, 
contributions, grant expenditures, the years of ties to other nonprofit agencies, and the 
number of professional associations demonstrated positive relationships in the between 
effects models but not in the fixed effects models.  Higher levels of all of these variables, 
controlling for all other variables, were correlated to higher levels of HRSA funding.  
However, increasing or decreasing any of these variables in an organization over the five 
fiscal years did not affect HRSA funding for that organization.  The number of volunteers 
and grant revenue was negatively correlated to HRSA funding in the between effects 
model but not significant in the fixed effects model.  For all seven variables, changes 
from year to year within an organization had no effect on HRSA funding. 
Of particular interest was what happened with total revenue and total assets when 
comparing the fixed and the between effects models.  Both of these variables were 
significant in the fixed and the between effects regressions; however, the direction of the 
relationship changed between the two regressions.  In the fixed effect regression, total 
revenue was positively correlated to HRSA funding while it was negatively related to 
funding in the between effects model.  When an organization increased its revenue over 
the five fiscal years, it was expected to increase HRSA funding.  However, organizations 
that had higher levels of revenue were correlated to lower levels of HRSA funding.  In 
other words, organizations with low levels of revenue were correlated with more HRSA 
funding and, when revenue increased from year to year, HRSA funding also increased.  
Conversely, total assets were negatively correlated to funding in the fixed effects 
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regression and positively correlated to funding in the between effects.  When an 
organization decreased the amounts of assets from year to year, HRSA funding increased.  
However, those organizations with higher amounts of assets were expected to receive 
more HRSA funding.  Organizations with more assets may have more operational costs 
but when an organization lost assets, HRSA funds were expected to increase perhaps 
demonstrating a greater financial burden. 
The same type of relationship existed with grant expenditures and predicted 
funding.  There was not a significant impact that changes in grant expenditures had on 
predicted HRSA funding in the fixed effects models but average levels of grant 
expenditures had a strong positive correlation to average levels of anticipated funding in 
the between effects models.  Within organizations across time, granting out money to 
local governments and other agencies did not predict future HRSA funding.  However, 
between organizations, there was a strong positive correlation.  As agencies grant out 
funds to local governments, a large increase in HRSA funding was expected.  As 
mentioned previously, granting out funds may mean that an agency utilized other entities 
for operations.  By outsourcing, a nonprofit expanded its services and funded its current 
and new operational costs through grants. 
Once again, relationship variables were divided into two categories, number and 
length.  The two categories in many cases showed positive and negative effects as 
described earlier.  As with the non-panel regressions, percentages that board members 
had to each tie was used to determine any consistency and explanatory reasoning for 
changing directions of relationship variables.  However, once again, the data did not 
provide consistent support for the idea that the number and years of each tie were ratio 
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components of an overarching relationship variable.  These findings did not necessarily 
invalidate the argument.  The data presented in this study did not provide consistent 
support. 
Overall, it was important to note that relationship ties were relatively weak in 
comparison to financial and organizational ties.  When relationship ties were statistically 
significant in the various analyses, there was often a weak effect in comparison to other 
variables.  The largest effects tended to be financial variables, particularly grant 
expenditures.  What was unclear is whether or not financial variables were indirectly 
influenced by relationship ties.  The use of mediation analyses indicated that there was 
weak support for mediation among variables in the between effects models.  There was 
no mediation among the fixed effects models.  However, it was possible that there were 
other connections between financial and relationship tie variables that were not explored 
in this study.   
Finally, there were large differences between the coefficients of the between-
effects and the fixed-effects models.  As mentioned earlier, many of the variables were 
statistically significant in the between effects regressions but not significant in the fixed 
effects regressions.  In essence, changes in these variables do not result in changes in 
HRSA funding for an organization from year to year.  It is likely that there were large 
differences between the groups of agencies.  While sampling was controlled as best as 
possible, variety among agencies remained an issue.  The sampling was restricted to one 
type of nonprofit community healthcare care center.  Yet, even with such parameters, 
differences among agencies remained a factor.  One agency in rural Appalachia is vastly 
different than another agency in urban Cleveland, Ohio.  As shown in the number of 
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employees, larger organizations receive more funding.  Both agencies are in the same 
NTEE code category.  Relatively few variables had longitudinal effects.  When an 
organization experienced changes in many of these variables, there was no effect on 
HRSA funding from year to year.  However, more variables had an effect when 
examining relationships among agencies.  The variety of types of agencies within the 
NTEE category affected the amount of HRSA funding.  Larger organizations were 
correlated to more HRSA funding.  However, increasing the number of employees within 
an organization did not have an impact. 
There were a multitude of variables that can influence funding decisions; only a 
fraction was examined here.  The types of HRSA grants studied varied widely in 
programmatic scope (Table 4.1).  Some grants focused on capital project construction 
while others focused on community outreach geared towards specifically targeted 
populations.  What these grants all had in common was that they fell under the umbrella 
agency of HRSA for the purposes of enhancing medical services for nonprofit 
community healthcare agencies.  According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services (2016c), for each grant, a funding opportunity was released to the public 
detailing the requirements and objectives of the grant.  While each HRSA grant had 
differing objectives, the application process for all grants was generally the same.  
Interested agencies wrote narratives that outlined their intended plans to fulfill the 
objectives of the grant if they were selected.  An independent panel rated applications 
based upon criteria such as the needs of the agency, the population that the agency 
served, alignment with community needs assessments, the feasibility of an agency’s work 
plan, the agency’s ability to resolve challenges, and the ability to evaluate the outcomes 
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of the project.  The score of an agency’s grant application depended upon how well the 
agency addressed each of the points in the grant announcement.  Once applications were 
scored, a final rater ensured adherence to any regulations such as minority-owned status 
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2016c). 
It was possible that the financial variables measured in this study correlated to 
application scores based upon needs while organizational variables correlated with an 
agency’s capacity and capability.  However, relationship ties may not correlate to any of 
the narrative sections and would not have been an explicitly stated determinant of a 
rater’s decision.  It would be a difficult endeavor to measure any personal biases that a 
rater would have in the review process.  The nature of the review panel also minimizes 
personal relationship biases.  The application process is intended to be objective.  The 
relatively weak effects of relationship ties could be due to the design and objectiveness of 
the application process. 
Summary 
 A series of t-tests and regressions was conducted to determine the effect that 
social relationship, financial, and organizational variables had on the amount of HRSA 
funding that nonprofit community healthcare agencies received over a five-year fiscal 
period.   
When utilizing t-tests to compare the means of explanatory variables between 
agencies that received HRSA funds versus agencies that did not receive funds, there were 
twelve independent variables that were significantly different between the two groups:  
the number of board members, the number of volunteers, the number of employees, 
incoming grant revenue, incoming contributions, the percentage of board members with 
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ties to other nonprofit agencies, the total years of ties to other nonprofit agencies, the total 
years of ties to other for-profit agencies, the total number of professional association 
memberships, the total years of professional association memberships, the percentage of 
board members with ties to other nonprofit boards, and the total number of appointments 
to other nonprofit boards.  
Conducting a probit regression revealed that some of the relationships that were 
significant in the t-tests remained significant.  Variables that increased the probability of 
obtaining HRSA funding included the number of employees, receiving HRSA funding 
prior to 2008, contributions, number of ties to government agencies, number of years of 
ties to government agencies, total number of ties to other for-profit agencies, total years 
of membership in professional associations, and total number of appointments to other 
nonprofit boards.  Variables that decreased the likelihood of HRSA funding included the 
number of volunteers, total revenue, the number of ties to other nonprofits, number of 
years of ties to universities, total number of memberships in a professional association, 
and total number of years of appointments at other nonprofit boards.  All other variables 
in the probit model were not statistically significant. 
Multiple regressions revealed a series of both positive and negative relationships 
between the independent variables and the amount of HRSA funding.  Further analyses 
supported that there was a mediating relationship between many of the variables and 
having HRSA funds prior to 2008.  However, non-panel regressions were used as a 
model building effort for panel regressions. 
 When considering panel data, several relationships existed across time.  There 
seemed to be few variables that were statistically significant when considering a fixed 
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effects model within the agencies across time. In the fixed effects model, there were three 
variables that were statistically significant:  incoming grant revenue, the number of ties to 
a university, and the years that a board member is in a professional association.  The 
financial variable, grant revenue, had a positive impact when examining variance within 
organizations across time.  The relationship ties related to the number of university ties 
and the length of professional association membership had small negative effects on 
predicted funding.  There was also no evidence of any mediation occurring in the fixed 
effects models. 
Utilizing a between effects model revealed larger prediction variation between 
agencies.  Five variables showed a positive effect while three variables were inversely 
related to predicted funding.  The strongest relationships occurred with financial and 
organizational variables.  Variables that were positively related to future HRSA funding 
included the number of employees, HRSA funding prior to 2008, contributions, grant 
expenditures, and the length of ties that a board member had to government agencies.  
Variables that were negatively related to funding included total revenue, total assets, and 
the length of membership in a professional association.  There were two variables, 
number of board members and number of volunteers, which demonstrated mediation by 
prior HRSA funding.  The number of board members was positively correlated to 
previous HRSA funding while the number of volunteers was negatively correlated.  The 
size of the board and the pool of volunteers appeared to indirectly affect predicted 
funding between organizations but only when an organization received HRSA funding 
prior to 2008.  However, the positive relationship between grant expenditures and 
funding became weaker in the presence of HRSA funding prior to 2008.  Grant 
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expenditures had an effect on predicted funding while also being affected by the presence 
of pre 2008 HRSA funding. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In general, analyses showed that social connections did not have a strong impact 
on the acquisition of future HRSA funding.  In some analyses, relationships existed; 
however, the impact of social connections were relatively small in comparison to other 
variables.  In many cases, financial and organizational variables had a greater effect on 
funding.   
A history of previous funding seemed to have a consistently positive relationship 
with anticipated funding.  It seemed logical that agencies that have already received 
HRSA funding will have a greater likelihood of obtaining more funding.  While the exact 
mechanism of why such a relationship existed was not examined, it was possible that an 
historical link to a funding source provided a facilitated outlet to future funding from the 
same source.  Legitimacy and reputation might play a role in this relationship.  It was also 
possible that obtaining one grant from an agency indicated that a nonprofit utilized funds 
in an effective manner.  HRSA funds are a diverse pool of programmatic initiatives.  
Obtaining one grant could ease the acquisition of another grant.  In a sense, increasing 
one type of funding from the HRSA pool increases funding from other areas as some 
research suggests (Brooks, 2000; Diamond, 1999; Huetel, 2014).  Such a relationship 
may indicate that an agency is an established and reputable service provider.  This 
finding relates to the previously mentioned work of Milward and Provan (2000) in that 
the hollow state of the government gives rise to multiple influences on service provision.  
Several layers of administration add to the difficulty of monitoring adequate service 
provision.  A stable system in which reputable providers with a history of grant contract 
adherence ensures that government receives quality services. 
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However, grant expenditures also had a large effect on HRSA funding as well.  
Grant money leaving the organization was a strong predictor of increases in future 
funding.  Increases in grant expenditures may indicate that an agency utilized other 
entities for operations in a way to outsource expanded services.  The nonprofit expanded 
its services and funded its current and new operational costs through grants. 
There was a large negative effect between the number of university ties and 
predicted funding.  Ties to a university might encourage and facilitate funding from 
universities rather than from government agencies.  In this case, revenue from a 
university grant replaced revenue from a government grant.  This provided some support 
that network connections had an effect on potential funding.  However, it was also 
possible that university ties were indicative of affiliation to a larger university health care 
system.  A health care agency may be a part of a state university’s health care network 
and receive annual allocated revenue as a result. 
The time of membership in professional associations also seemed to have a 
negative effect on funding.  While this relationship was weak, it was a consistently 
negative relationship across analyses.  In this case, remaining a member of a professional 
association decreased funding.  It seemed that the volume of memberships had a greater 
impact on funding than remaining in a professional association for a long period of time.  
Memberships in a greater number of associations may provide easy access to a vast 
number of connections that are not necessarily strong.  This finding provided support for 
Granovetter’s (1972) research on the strength of weak ties.   
Finally, it seemed that there were some variables, such as the number of board 
members, which had an indirect effect on anticipated funding.  Mediated variables had an 
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effect on anticipated funding through previous HRSA funding.  The number of board 
members mattered but only in organizations that received HRSA funds in the past.  It was 
simply not enough to have a large board.  The board members must have served in a 
nonprofit with a history of success in grant acquisition in order to have an impact on 
future funding. 
The study found partial support for the hypothesis that relationship ties had an 
effect on funding.  However, relationship ties were not the only variables that contributed 
to the likelihood of funding.  Financial variables had a significant impact on acquiring 
funding.  In this vein, nonprofits are not discouraged from establishing network ties.  In 
fact, relationships to other nonprofits have an effect.  However, the nonprofit in search of 
funds is wise to not rely solely upon relationships to other agencies.  It is vital that 
nonprofits continue to monitor their fiscal health. 
Of particular interest was that in all of the analyses conducted, government ties 
had little to no effect on funding probability.  Previous ties to government seemed to 
make no difference in the acquisition of future federal HRSA grants.  The finding is 
counterintuitive to previous knowledge.  It is unclear if the finding is a result of data 
artifacts or if there is a true non-existent effect between government ties and funding.  It 
is possible that government agencies did not consider former employees as a determinate 
for grant funding.  This finding supports the efforts of the government to remain 
objective in awarding grants based upon application merit.  It is also plausible that 
agencies with previous ties to government were able to secure operational funds through 
alternate sources.  Board members with ties to government may have more experience in 
the grant application process or in public administrative roles and therefore can navigate 
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funding acquisition procedures.  Revenue for such agencies may come from private 
donors or corporations.  Revenue may also come from grants that were not related to 
HRSA.  These agencies may secure grants from large hospitals or universities.  In order 
to factor other revenue sources into the model, it will be necessary to go beyond HRSA 
funds and examine other funding sources.  It is important to note that grant data in the 
proposed analyses did not include fees-for-service revenue such as funds reimbursed 
through Medicare.  The focus of the current study was to examine the effect of 
relationships on non-entitlement revenue. 
Not all board members have equal political status.  It was possible that an agency 
had a board member with ties that overshadowed the ties of other board members.  The 
overriding tie was an instance when a prominent board member had a key, politically 
important tie.  Overriding ties may not fully explain why there were weak relationships 
between social connections and funding.  A way to examine differing weights of board 
member ties is to conduct a formal network analysis (Borgatti et al., 2009).  By 
conducting a formal network analysis, board members are asked about their connections 
to other agencies.  While this methodology is beyond the scope of this research study, 
network analyses would be a beneficial addition to a future study. 
Findings that agencies with previous grants were more likely to receive funds may 
also be due to alternative variables.  Agencies that already received grants may have an 
agreement with government to continue to provide services.  Continued service requires 
additional funds that must be acquired from the granting authority.  However, it could be 
argued that these cycles are simply a manifestation of established reputation.  Such was 
the case with the relationship between previous and anticipated HRSA funds.  If an 
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agency initially provided services, the granting authority will continue to fund the agency 
based upon its established performance.  The agency’s performance becomes a part of its 
reputation.  Utilizing an historical variable, funding prior to 2008, captured the 
relationship between past and future funding.  The strong relationship between prior and 
predicted funding supports this line of reasoning. 
 The methods of data collection may certainly lend themselves to critique.  For 
instance, there are more accurate ways in which to measure relationship and network ties.  
As previously mentioned, network analysis is traditionally conducted by surveying 
employees to obtain frequency of encounters with other employees and agencies 
(Borgatti, et al., 2009).  A direct network analysis measurement, while self-reported, 
provides researchers with a first person examination of the relationship network in an 
organization.  Interpretation of archival data may foster data artifacts.  To make 
interpretation of archival data stronger, it is recommended that a second or third 
researcher rate the number and the length of relationship ties.  By employing more than 
one rater, reliability of relationship data increases. 
One final point to mention is that there may be a bias in the data in favor of board 
members that choose to fill out online biographical data.  Completion of a LinkedIn 
profile was either voluntary or up to the policy of the organization.  There may be 
underlying characteristics of individuals that completed online information translating 
into the organization’s policy on funding.  For example, a board member with a LinkedIn 
profile may have more knowledge about online social media outlets.  Social media savvy 
may equate to having a greater awareness of funding opportunities.  It is plausible that 
more knowledge of available funding sources led to an increase in grant applications and 
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thus a stronger probability of award.  It was also possible that there were personality 
characteristics of individuals with LinkedIn profiles that had an effect on grant 
application and award.  Whether such personality characteristics made a significant 
impact is a valid research question that warrants future investigation. 
One potential drawback of relationship ties as mentioned in Pearch, Dibble, and 
Klein (2009) is that nonprofits that rely heavily upon government funding are no longer 
entirely independent entities.  These agencies become a variable in the “hollow state” 
equation (Milward & Provan, 2000).  Nonprofit dependence creates competition among 
similar nonprofits in securing funding.  The mission of a nonprofit then changes in an 
effort to appease funding requirements.  It is possible for a health care organization that 
originally intended to serve one population to shift priorities to another population out of 
funder requirements.  Larger organizations with other revenue sources may be able to 
handle multiple priorities and missions.  Smaller organizations, however, that find 
themselves in great financial need and are more reliant upon grant revenue are required to 
mold themselves into what the funder dictates.  However, agencies are never forced to 
apply for grants in which the agency does not support.  Even when an agency is 
confronted with financial burden, applying for a grant that is counter to an agency’s 
mission will result in future issues. 
It should be noted that even though agencies, particularly smaller agencies, are 
advised to be somewhat selective in their granting activities, too much caution can be 
detrimental to organizations with great financial burdens.  Findings of this study 
suggested that there were minor advantages to relationship ties.  In some cases, as with 
university ties, there were disadvantages on the effect of potential funding.  Yet, some of 
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the relationship variables show small effects on predicted funding.  An organization that 
is in dire need of financial resources may find that the time spent in nurturing 
relationships is time well spent.  The small difference between no funds and a few 
thousand dollars in annual appropriations can make a notable impact on a struggling 
organization.  Therefore, though some ties had a small impact, the effort to nurture 
relationships may be beneficial. 
The current study was a first step in understanding the relevance of relationship 
ties to nonprofit fiscal administration.  Mikkelson (2006) made the argument that 
understanding how policy networks influenced decisions regarding nonprofits was 
important to the mission of these organizations.  The notion of networking with 
government officials and other board members in order to secure funding is an anecdotal 
practice that has significant implications in nonprofit fundraising.  Further investigation 
with revisions to technique can enrich the existing body of knowledge.  By supporting 
anecdotal beliefs with empirical evidence of efficacy, the practice of network 
participation can further become an industry best practice in the pursuit of scarce 
financial resources.   
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APPENDIX 
 
Equation 1:  Probit regression of all variables for all organizations. 
Pr(Y = 1|X) = ϕ(ߚଵ ଵܺ + ߚଶܺଶ൅	ߚଷܺଷ ൅ ߚସܺସ ൅ ߚହܺହ ൅	ߚ଺ܺ଺ ൅	ߚ଻ܺ଻ ൅	ߚ଼଼ܺ ൅	ߚଽܺଽ ൅	ߚଵ଴ ଵܺ଴ ൅ ߚଵଵ ଵܺଵ ൅	ߚଵଶ ଵܺଶ ൅	ߚଵଷ ଵܺଷ ൅	ߚଵସ ଵܺସ ൅	ߚଵହ ଵܺହ ൅	ߚଵ଺ ଵܺ଺ ൅	ߚଵ଻ ଵܺ଻ ൅	ߚଵ଼ ଵ଼ܺ ൅	ߚଵଽ ଵܺଽ ൅	ߚଶ଴ܺଶ଴ ൅	ߚଶଵܺଶଵ ൅ ߝሻ 
 
List of Variables for Equation 1. 
Variable Label Variable Definition 
y 1 if the amount of HRSA funding received for the following fiscal year is 
greater than 0 and where y = 0 if otherwise 
Pr Probability 
ϕ Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the standard normal distribution 
Organizational Variables 
ଵܺ number of board members for the previous fiscal year 
ܺଶ number of volunteers for the previous fiscal year 
ܺଷ number of employees in thousands for the previous fiscal year Financial Variables 
ܺସ receiving HRSA funding prior to 2008 (dichotomous where 1 = yes and 0 = no) 
ܺହ total revenue in millions for the previous fiscal year 
ܺ଺ total assets in millions for the previous fiscal year 
ܺ଻ grant revenue in millions for the previous fiscal year 
଼ܺ amount of contributions in millions for the previous fiscal year 
ܺଽ grant expenditures in millions for the previous fiscal year Relationship Variables 
ଵܺ଴ total number of ties to other nonprofit agencies for the previous fiscal year 
ଵܺଵ total years of nonprofit ties for the previous fiscal year 
ଵܺଶ total number of ties to government agencies for the previous fiscal year 
ଵܺଷ total years of government ties for the previous fiscal year 
ଵܺସ total number of ties to for-profit agencies for the previous fiscal year 
ଵܺହ total years of for-profit ties for the previous fiscal year 
ଵܺ଺ total number of ties to universities for the previous fiscal year 
ଵܺ଻ total years of university ties for the previous fiscal year 
ଵ଼ܺ total number of memberships in a professional association for the previous fiscal year 
ଵܺଽ total years of memberships in a professional association for the previous fiscal year 
ܺଶ଴ total number of appointments to other nonprofit boards for the previous fiscal year 
ܺଶଵ total years of appointments to other nonprofit boards for the previous fiscal year 
ߝ amount of error in the model 
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Multiple Regression Models for Non-panel Analyses 
Equation 2 
All organizations; Predicted funding as dependent variable; All lagged independent 
variables 
y	ൌ	ߚ଴ ൅	ߚଵ ଵܺ + ߚଶܺଶ൅ ߚଷܺଷ ൅ ߚସܺସ ൅ ߚହܺହ ൅ ߚ଺ܺ଺ ൅ ߚ଻ܺ଻ ൅	ߚ଼଼ܺ ൅	ߚଽܺଽ ൅	ߚଵ଴ ଵܺ଴ ൅ ߚଵଵ ଵܺଵ ൅ ߚଵଶ ଵܺଶ ൅ ߚଵଷ ଵܺଷ ൅ ߚଵସ ଵܺସ ൅	ߚଵହ ଵܺହ ൅	ߚଵ଺ ଵܺ଺ ൅	ߚଵ଻ ଵܺ଻ ൅ ߚଵ଼ ଵ଼ܺ ൅ ߚଵଽ ଵܺଽ ൅ ߚଶ଴ܺଶ଴ ൅ ߚଶଵܺଶଵ ൅ ߝ Equation 3 
All organizations; HRSA funding prior to 2008 as dependent variable; All other 
lagged independent variables 
ߚସܺସ	as	y	ൌ	ߚ଴ ൅	ߚଵ ଵܺ + ߚଶܺଶ൅ ߚଷܺଷ ൅ ߚହܺହ ൅ ߚ଺ܺ଺ ൅	ߚ଻ܺ଻ ൅	ߚ଼଼ܺ ൅	ߚଽܺଽ ൅	ߚଵ଴ ଵܺ଴ ൅ ߚଵଵ ଵܺଵ ൅ ߚଵଶ ଵܺଶ ൅ ߚଵଷ ଵܺଷ ൅ ߚଵସ ଵܺସ ൅	ߚଵହ ଵܺହ ൅	ߚଵ଺ ଵܺ଺ ൅	ߚଵ଻ ଵܺ଻ ൅ ߚଵ଼ ଵ଼ܺ ൅ ߚଵଽ ଵܺଽ ൅ ߚଶ଴ܺଶ଴ ൅ ߚଶଵܺଶଵ ൅ ߝ Equation 4 
Funded organizations; Predicted funding as dependent variable; All lagged 
independent variables 
y	ሺwhere	y	൐	0ሻ	ൌ	ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ ଵܺ + ߚଶܺଶ൅ ߚଷܺଷ ൅ ߚସܺସ ൅ ߚହܺହ ൅	ߚ଺ܺ଺ ൅	ߚ଻ܺ଻ ൅	ߚ଼଼ܺ ൅	ߚଽܺଽ ൅ ߚଵ଴ ଵܺ଴ ൅ ߚଵଵ ଵܺଵ ൅ ߚଵଶ ଵܺଶ ൅ ߚଵଷ ଵܺଷ ൅	ߚଵସ ଵܺସ ൅	ߚଵହ ଵܺହ ൅	ߚଵ଺ ଵܺ଺ ൅ ߚଵ଻ ଵܺ଻ ൅ ߚଵ଼ ଵ଼ܺ ൅ ߚଵଽ ଵܺଽ ൅ ߚଶ଴ܺଶ଴ ൅	ߚଶଵܺଶଵ ൅ ߝ Equation 5 
Funded organizations; HRSA funding prior to 2008 as dependent variable; All other 
lagged independent variables 
ߚସܺସ	as	y	ሺwhere	y	൐	0ሻ	ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ ଵܺ + ߚଶܺଶ൅ ߚଷܺଷ ൅ ߚହܺହ ൅	ߚ଺ܺ଺ ൅	ߚ଻ܺ଻ ൅	ߚ଼଼ܺ ൅	ߚଽܺଽ ൅ ߚଵ଴ ଵܺ଴ ൅ ߚଵଵ ଵܺଵ ൅ ߚଵଶ ଵܺଶ ൅ ߚଵଷ ଵܺଷ ൅	ߚଵସ ଵܺସ ൅	ߚଵହ ଵܺହ ൅	ߚଵ଺ ଵܺ଺ ൅ ߚଵ଻ ଵܺ଻ ൅ ߚଵ଼ ଵ଼ܺ ൅ ߚଵଽ ଵܺଽ ൅ ߚଶ଴ܺଶ଴ ൅	ߚଶଵܺଶଵ ൅ ߝ 
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List of Variables for Equations 2 – 5. 
Variable Label Variable Definition 
y amount of HRSA funding received for the following fiscal year 
Organizational Variables 
ଵܺ number of board members for the previous fiscal year 
ܺଶ number of volunteers for the previous fiscal year 
ܺଷ number of employees in thousands for the previous fiscal year Financial Variables 
ܺସ receiving HRSA funding prior to 2008 (dichotomous where 1 = yes and 0 = no) 
ܺହ total revenue in millions for the previous fiscal year 
ܺ଺ total assets in millions for the previous fiscal year 
ܺ଻ grant revenue in millions for the previous fiscal year 
଼ܺ amount of contributions in millions for the previous fiscal year 
ܺଽ grant expenditures in millions for the previous fiscal year Relationship Variables 
ଵܺ଴ total number of ties to other nonprofit agencies for the previous fiscal year 
ଵܺଵ total years of nonprofit ties for the previous fiscal year 
ଵܺଶ total number of ties to government agencies for the previous fiscal year 
ଵܺଷ total years of government ties for the previous fiscal year 
ଵܺସ total number of ties to for-profit agencies for the previous fiscal year 
ଵܺହ total years of for-profit ties for the previous fiscal year 
ଵܺ଺ total number of ties to universities for the previous fiscal year 
ଵܺ଻ total years of university ties for the previous fiscal year 
ଵ଼ܺ total number of memberships in a professional association for the previous fiscal year 
ଵܺଽ total years of memberships in a professional association for the previous fiscal year 
ܺଶ଴ total number of appointments to other nonprofit boards for the previous fiscal year 
ܺଶଵ total years of appointments to other nonprofit boards for the previous fiscal year 
ߝ amount of error in the model 
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Fixed-effects and Between-effects Regression Models for Panel Analyses. 
Equation 6 
Model 1 
All organizations; Predicted funding as dependent variable; All independent lagged 
variables 
1 A 
Fixed Effects 
 
ݕ௜௧	ൌ	 ߚଵ ௜ܺ௧ଵ + ߚଶ ௜ܺ௧ଶ൅ ߚଷ ௜ܺ௧ଷ ൅ ߚସ ௜ܺ௧ସ ൅ ߚହ ௜ܺ௧ହ ൅	ߚ଺ ௜ܺ௧଺ ൅	ߚ଻ ௜ܺ௧଻ ൅ ߚ଼ ௜ܺ௧଼ ൅ ߚଽ ௜ܺ௧ଽ ൅ ߚଵ଴ ௜ܺ௧ଵ଴ ൅ ߚଵଵ ௜ܺ௧ଵଵ ൅	ߚଵଶ ௜ܺ௧ଵଶ ൅	ߚଵଷ ௜ܺ௧ଵଷ ൅	ߚଵସ ௜ܺ௧ଵସ ൅	ߚଵହ ௜ܺ௧ଵହ ൅	ߚଵ଺ ௜ܺ௧ଵ଺ ൅	ߚଵ଻ ௜ܺ௧ଵ଻ ൅	ߚଵ଼ ௜ܺ௧ଵ଼ ൅ ߚଵଽ ௜ܺ௧ଵଽ ൅ ߚଶ଴ ௜ܺ௧ଶ଴ ൅ ߚଶଵ ௜ܺ௧ଶଵ ൅ ߙ௜ ൅ ݑ௜௧, ݐ ൌ1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
1 B 
Between Effects 
ݕ௜௧	ൌ	ߚଵ ௜ܺ௧ଵ + ߚଶ ௜ܺ௧ଶ൅ ߚଷ ௜ܺ௧ଷ ൅ ߚସ ௜ܺ௧ସ ൅ ߚହ ௜ܺ௧ହ ൅	ߚ଺ ௜ܺ௧଺ ൅	ߚ଻ ௜ܺ௧଻ ൅ ߚ଼ ௜ܺ௧଼ ൅ ߚଽ ௜ܺ௧ଽ ൅ ߚଵ଴ ௜ܺ௧ଵ଴ ൅ ߚଵଵ ௜ܺ௧ଵଵ ൅	ߚଵଶ ௜ܺ௧ଵଶ ൅	ߚଵଷ ௜ܺ௧ଵଷ ൅	ߚଵସ ௜ܺ௧ଵସ ൅	ߚଵହ ௜ܺ௧ଵହ ൅	ߚଵ଺ ௜ܺ௧ଵ଺ ൅	ߚଵ଻ ௜ܺ௧ଵ଻ ൅	ߚଵ଼ ௜ܺ௧ଵ଼ ൅ ߚଵଽ ௜ܺ௧ଵଽ ൅ ߚଶ଴ ௜ܺ௧ଶ଴ ൅ ߚଶଵ ௜ܺ௧ଶଵ ൅ ݑ௜௧ ൅	ߝ௜, ݐ ൌ1, 2, 3, 4, 5.  
Equation 7 
Model 2 
All organizations; HRSA funding prior to 2008 as dependent variable; All other 
independent lagged variables 
2 A 
Fixed Effects 
ߚସ ௜ܺ௧ସ ܽݏ ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߚଵ ௜ܺ௧ଵ + ߚଶ ௜ܺ௧ଶ൅ ߚଷ ௜ܺ௧ଷ ൅ ߚହ ௜ܺ௧ହ ൅	ߚ଺ ௜ܺ௧଺ ൅	ߚ଻ ௜ܺ௧଻ ൅ ߚ଼ ௜ܺ௧଼ ൅ ߚଽ ௜ܺ௧ଽ ൅ ߚଵ଴ ௜ܺ௧ଵ଴ ൅ ߚଵଵ ௜ܺ௧ଵଵ ൅	ߚଵଶ ௜ܺ௧ଵଶ ൅	ߚଵଷ ௜ܺ௧ଵଷ ൅ ߚଵସ ௜ܺ௧ଵସ ൅ ߚଵହ ௜ܺ௧ଵହ ൅ ߚଵ଺ ௜ܺ௧ଵ଺ ൅	ߚଵ଻ ௜ܺ௧ଵ଻ ൅	ߚଵ଼ ௜ܺ௧ଵ଼ ൅ ߚଵଽ ௜ܺ௧ଵଽ ൅ ߚଶ଴ ௜ܺ௧ଶ଴ ൅ ߙ௜ ൅ ݑ௜௧, ݐ ൌ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.2 B 
Between Effects 
ߚସ ௜ܺ௧ସ	ܽݏ ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߚଵ ௜ܺ௧ଵ + ߚଶ ௜ܺ௧ଶ൅ ߚଷ ௜ܺ௧ଷ ൅ ߚହ ௜ܺ௧ହ ൅	ߚ଺ ௜ܺ௧଺ ൅	ߚ଻ ௜ܺ௧଻ ൅ ߚ଼ ௜ܺ௧଼ ൅ ߚଽ ௜ܺ௧ଽ ൅ ߚଵ଴ ௜ܺ௧ଵ଴ ൅ ߚଵଵ ௜ܺ௧ଵଵ ൅	ߚଵଶ ௜ܺ௧ଵଶ ൅	ߚଵଷ ௜ܺ௧ଵଷ ൅ ߚଵସ ௜ܺ௧ଵସ ൅ ߚଵହ ௜ܺ௧ଵହ ൅ ߚଵ଺ ௜ܺ௧ଵ଺ ൅	ߚଵ଻ ௜ܺ௧ଵ଻ ൅	ߚଵ଼ ௜ܺ௧ଵ଼ ൅ ߚଵଽ ௜ܺ௧ଵଽ ൅ ߚଶ଴ ௜ܺ௧ଶ଴ ൅ ݑ௜௧ ൅ ߝ௜, ݐ ൌ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Equation 8 
Model 3 
Funded organizations; Predicted funding as dependent variable; All independent 
lagged variables 
3 A 
Fixed Effects 
ݕ௜௧	ሺwhere	y	൐	0ሻ	ൌ ߚଵ ௜ܺ௧ଵ + ߚଶ ௜ܺ௧ଶ൅ ߚଷ ௜ܺ௧ଷ ൅ ߚସ ௜ܺ௧ସ ൅ߚହ ௜ܺ௧ହ ൅ ߚ଺ ௜ܺ௧଺ ൅ ߚ଻ ௜ܺ௧଻ ൅ ߚ଼ ௜ܺ௧଼ ൅ ߚଽ ௜ܺ௧ଽ ൅	ߚଵ଴ ௜ܺ௧ଵ଴ ൅ߚଵଵ ௜ܺ௧ଵଵ ൅	ߚଵଶ ௜ܺ௧ଵଶ ൅	ߚଵଷ ௜ܺ௧ଵଷ ൅	ߚଵସ ௜ܺ௧ଵସ ൅	ߚଵହ ௜ܺ௧ଵହ ൅	ߚଵ଺ ௜ܺ௧ଵ଺ ൅ ߚଵ଻ ௜ܺ௧ଵ଻ ൅ ߚଵ଼ ௜ܺ௧ଵ଼ ൅ ߚଵଽ ௜ܺ௧ଵଽ ൅	ߚଶ଴ ௜ܺ௧ଶ଴ ൅	ߚଶଵ ௜ܺ௧ଶଵ ൅ ߙ௜ ൅ ݑ௜௧, ݐ ൌ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. 3 B 
Between Effects 
ݕ௜௧	ሺwhere	y	൐	0ሻ	ൌ ߚଵ ௜ܺ௧ଵ + ߚଶ ௜ܺ௧ଶ൅ ߚଷ ௜ܺ௧ଷ ൅ ߚସ ௜ܺ௧ସ ൅ߚହ ௜ܺ௧ହ ൅ ߚ଺ ௜ܺ௧଺ ൅ ߚ଻ ௜ܺ௧଻ ൅ ߚ଼ ௜ܺ௧଼ ൅ ߚଽ ௜ܺ௧ଽ ൅	ߚଵ଴ ௜ܺ௧ଵ଴ ൅ߚଵଵ ௜ܺ௧ଵଵ ൅	ߚଵଶ ௜ܺ௧ଵଶ ൅	ߚଵଷ ௜ܺ௧ଵଷ ൅	ߚଵସ ௜ܺ௧ଵସ ൅	ߚଵହ ௜ܺ௧ଵହ ൅	ߚଵ଺ ௜ܺ௧ଵ଺ ൅ ߚଵ଻ ௜ܺ௧ଵ଻ ൅ ߚଵ଼ ௜ܺ௧ଵ଼ ൅ ߚଵଽ ௜ܺ௧ଵଽ ൅	ߚଶ଴ ௜ܺ௧ଶ଴ ൅	ߚଶଵ ௜ܺ௧ଶଵ ൅ ݑ௜௧ ൅ ߝ௜, ݐ ൌ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.  
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Equation 9 
Model 4 
Funded organizations; HRSA funding prior to 2008 as dependent variable; All other 
independent lagged variables 
4 A 
Fixed Effects 
ߚସ ௜ܺ௧ସ ܽݏ ݕ௜௧ ሺwhere	y	൐	0ሻ	ൌ ߚଵ ௜ܺ௧ଵ + ߚଶ ௜ܺ௧ଶ൅	ߚଷ ௜ܺ௧ଷ ൅ߚହ ௜ܺ௧ହ ൅ ߚ଺ ௜ܺ௧଺ ൅ ߚ଻ ௜ܺ௧଻ ൅ ߚ଼ ௜ܺ௧଼ ൅ ߚଽ ௜ܺ௧ଽ ൅	ߚଵ଴ ௜ܺ௧ଵ଴ ൅ߚଵଵ ௜ܺ௧ଵଵ ൅	ߚଵଶ ௜ܺ௧ଵଶ ൅	ߚଵଷ ௜ܺ௧ଵଷ ൅	ߚଵସ ௜ܺ௧ଵସ ൅	ߚଵହ ௜ܺ௧ଵହ ൅	ߚଵ଺ ௜ܺ௧ଵ଺ ൅ ߚଵ଻ ௜ܺ௧ଵ଻ ൅ ߚଵ଼ ௜ܺ௧ଵ଼ ൅ ߚଵଽ ௜ܺ௧ଵଽ ൅	ߚଶ଴ ௜ܺ௧ଶ଴ ൅ ߙ௜ ൅ݑ௜௧, ݐ ൌ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. 4 B 
Between Effects 
ߚସ ௜ܺ௧ସ	ܽݏ ݕ௜௧ ሺwhere	y	൐	0ሻ	ൌ ߚଵ ௜ܺ௧ଵ + ߚଶ ௜ܺ௧ଶ൅	ߚଷ ௜ܺ௧ଷ ൅ߚହ ௜ܺ௧ହ ൅ ߚ଺ ௜ܺ௧଺ ൅ ߚ଻ ௜ܺ௧଻ ൅ ߚ଼ ௜ܺ௧଼ ൅ ߚଽ ௜ܺ௧ଽ ൅	ߚଵ଴ ௜ܺ௧ଵ଴ ൅ߚଵଵ ௜ܺ௧ଵଵ ൅	ߚଵଶ ௜ܺ௧ଵଶ ൅	ߚଵଷ ௜ܺ௧ଵଷ ൅	ߚଵସ ௜ܺ௧ଵସ ൅	ߚଵହ ௜ܺ௧ଵହ ൅	ߚଵ଺ ௜ܺ௧ଵ଺ ൅ ߚଵ଻ ௜ܺ௧ଵ଻ ൅ ߚଵ଼ ௜ܺ௧ଵ଼ ൅ ߚଵଽ ௜ܺ௧ଵଽ ൅	ߚଶ଴ ௜ܺ௧ଶ଴ ൅ ݑ௜௧ ൅	ߝ௜, ݐ ൌ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.  
List of Variables for Equations 6 – 9. 
 
Variable Label Variable Definition 
y amount of HRSA funding received for the following fiscal year 
Organizational Variables 
௜ܺ௧ଵ number of board members for each fiscal year 
௜ܺ௧ଶ number of volunteers for each fiscal year 
௜ܺ௧ଷ number of employees in thousands for each fiscal year Financial Variables 
௜ܺ௧ସ receiving HRSA funding prior to 2008 (dichotomous where 1 = yes and 0 = no) 
௜ܺ௧ହ total revenue in millions for each fiscal year 
௜ܺ௧଺ total assets in millions for each fiscal year 
௜ܺ௧଻ grant revenue in millions for each fiscal year 
௜ܺ௧଼ amount of contributions in millions for each fiscal year 
௜ܺ௧ଽ grant expenditures in millions for each fiscal year Relationship Variables 
௜ܺ௧ଵ଴ total number of ties to other nonprofit agencies for each fiscal year 
௜ܺ௧ଵଵ total years of nonprofit ties for each fiscal year 
௜ܺ௧ଵଶ total number of ties to government agencies for each fiscal year 
௜ܺ௧ଵଷ total years of government ties for each fiscal year 
௜ܺ௧ଵସ total number of ties to for-profit agencies for each fiscal year 
௜ܺ௧ଵହ total years of for-profit ties for each fiscal year 
௜ܺ௧ଵ଺ total number of ties to universities for each fiscal year 
௜ܺ௧ଵ଻ total years of university ties for each fiscal year 
௜ܺ௧ଵ଼ total number of memberships in a professional association for each fiscal year 
௜ܺ௧ଵଽ total years of memberships in a professional association for each fiscal year 
௜ܺ௧ଶ଴ total number of appointments to other nonprofit boards for each fiscal year 
௜ܺ௧ଶଵ total years of appointments to other nonprofit boards for each fiscal year 
ߙ௜ fixed population variables over time 
ݑ௜௧ amount of fixed error in the model 
t fiscal year where 1 = fiscal year 2008, 2 = fiscal year 2009, …5 = fiscal year 
2012 
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